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ABSTRACT 
This study models the Tasmanian blackcurrant industry in a 
partial equilibrium context. The model developed is then used to 
address two policy issues, the impact of the Closer Economic 
Relationship (C.E.R) with New Zealand and an assessment of the 
impact on the industry of the Tasmanian Soft Fruit Industry Board 
as a statutory marketing authority. 
The models developed include both those based on adaptive 
expectations and on rational expectations. The preferred adaptive 
expectations model is then used to assess the welfare implications 
of the modification of the sales tax exemption for fruit under the 
auspices of C.E.R. The study indicates considerable effects on the 
industry as a result. 
The effect of the Tasmanian Soft Fruit Industry Board is 
found 	 to largely duplicate the pricing decisions of another 	—  
statutory authority, the Fruit industry Sugar Concession Committee. 
ix 
CHAPTER I 
THE BLACKCURRANT INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem  
The Tasmanian berry fruit industries, on examination, have 
contributed 	 a rather small amount 	 to the state's economy 
historically. 	 Thus, 	 it might be difficult to justify any more than 
token 	 interest in the stability and workings of these markets. 
Table 1 illustrates the position 	 of the •soft fruit industries 
relative 	 to the mainstays of the Tasmanian fruit industries, 
apples and 	 pears. 	 Furthermore, the production of soft fruits is 
more 	 diminutive when considering the state's total value of 
agricultural crops, as shown in Table 2. 
However, when one considers the decline in the apple and 
pear 	 industries over 	 the last 	 decade together 	 with the 
geographical 	 location of the majority of the apple and pear 	, 
orchards, the decline in the soft fruits industries (which are 
located principally in the south of Tasmania) takes on a different 
hue. Moreover, the existence of fruit processors spatially 
'proximate to the producers • confers significant cost advantages to 
consumers Australia-wide, while prdvi,di,dg,e:my)dyment opportunities 
for additional Tasmanians. 
1 
2 
TABLE I. GROSS VALUE or ritun, TASMANIA  
(3.'000) 
Kind of fruit 
_ 
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 
Orchard fruit - 
Apples (a) 12 546 11 	716 12 815 16 662 16 572 16 706 
Apricots 42 56 83 92 97 220 
Cherries 33 41 52 62 67 101 
Pears (a) 489 280 r 699 656 665 737 
Other 28 24 16 61 37  
Total 13 	138 12 	Ill r 13 465 17 513 17 438 17 782 
Berry and small fruit - 
Blackcurrants 	 • 234 316 474, 569 859 618 
Loganberries 72 126 104 	 1 108 137 116 
Raspberries 328 328 410 369 488 449 
Strawberries 115 130 139 174 186 256 
Other 45 43 99 130 112 (b) 	7 
Total 794 943 1 226 r 1 351 r 1 782 1 446 
Grapes 11 15 30 
lotal fruit (c) 13932 (c) 13080 (c)r 14 691 18 875 19 235 19 258 
(a) Includes net payments to growers (i.e. payments to growers less contributions by growers), under Government price 
support schemes, as follows: 
Apples - 1975-76, plus 53 282 000; 1976-77, plus $605 000; 1977-78. plus $436 000: 1978-79, plus 
$3 885 000; 1979-80, minus $110 000 and 1980-81. plus 93 273 000. 
Pears - 1975.-76, plus $19 000; 1976-77, minus $50; 1977-78, minus 62 000; 1978-79, minus $4 300; 
1979-80, minus $7 600 and 1980-81. nil. 
(b) from 1980-61, blackberries have been excluded from agricultural statistics. 
(c) Eacludes grapes. 
(a) 
(6) 
Source: A.B.S. "Fruit, Tasmania 1980-81" 
WILL 2 CROPS GROSS AND LOCAL VALUL (a), TASMANIA 
($'000) 
Particulars 
Gross value Local value 
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1976-79 1979-80 1980-81 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 
Craps 
Cereals for grain 
- Barley 817 2 729 2 339 3 293 2 138 2 742 1 718 2 615 2 110 3 063 2 036 2 500 
Oats 276 947 524 1 395 I 008 1 819 747 802 513 1 315 942 1 743 
Wheat 168 322 133 312 477 355 154 , 287 129 288 431 329 
Legumes mainly for 
grain - 
Peas, field 88 138 156 366 222 191 79 127 .139 326 195 182 
:raps for hay (b) 146 478 161 290 735 358 145 465 149 269 215 356 
Orchard tree fruit - 
Apples (c) 12 546 11 736 12 815 16 662 16 572 16 706 6 517 6 952 9 398 II 202 11 648 10 821 
Pears (c 489 280 499 656 .665 737 156 152 566 442 496 515 
.)ther 
decry and small fruit 
105 121 151 195 201 319 91 112 154 175 175 121 
Currants 234 316 474 569 859 618 234 516 474 569 859 618 
4aspherries 528 128 410 169 488 449 527 . 527 410 569 488 442 
Other 252 799 142 413 435 (0)379 225 294 328 598 416 (d)375 
Vegetables for sale fo 
human consumption - 
deans, French and 
runner 1 176 177 1 103 I 918. 007 1 856 1 176 I 577 1 105 1 918 1 007 l 856 
Carrots 485 1 191 296 1 627 1 179 2 261 454 1 086 1 186 1 490 1 266 2 211 
Onions I Ill 240 1 478 2 033 / 699 4 182 1 053 1 036 550 1 8.50 2 413 3 719 
Peas, green 5 039 4 956 4 507 4 778 4 082 4 710 3 039 4 955 4 306 4 777 4 081 4 707 
Potatoes 7 340 9 355 8 879 12 640 14 206 17 186 6 926 8 767 8 214 12 145 13 459 16 358 
Other r3 144 r5 239 rl 510 r4 206 r4 174 4 505 r2 890 r2 935 r3 254 0 936' r1 865 4 357 
Other crops - 
Hops I 575 2 254 2 351 3 209 All 4 678 1 42■ 7 185 2 164 2 856 2 659 4 091 
Other (b) 2 972 5 794 8 807 13 085 i; 545 7 906 2 751 5 555 8 328 12 499 7 474 7 372 
Pastor, harvested - 
Pasture for ha); 5 628 8 478 4 141 )01 I 751 7 687 !, 597 8 274 5 816 8 291 7 143 7 560 
Pasture for seed 52 128 85 621 433 660 SO 126 BO 604 390 645 
total crops 43 009 55 706 53 961 76 936 70 397 BO 324 35 230 48 703 47 847 68 760 61 656 71 098 
C.cludes crops and pasture harvested for green feed or silage. 
Evcludes pastures harvested for hay or seed - see 'Pasture harvested' below. (Note 	 Lucerne is classified as a component of sown pastures.) 
(c) Includes net payments to growers (i.e, payments to growers less contributions by growers), under Government price 
support schemes, as follows: 
Apples - 1975-76, plus $3 207 0001 1976-77. plus $605 000; 1977-78, plus $436 000; 
1978-79, plus 93 805 000; 1979-80, minus silo 000 and 1980-81, plum 13 271 000. 
Pears - 1975-76, plus $19 000; 1976-77, minus $50. 1977-78. minus 12 000: 1978-79, minus 14 SOO; 1979-80, minus $7 600 and 1980-81. nil. 
(8 	 From 1980-81, blackberries have been excluded from agricultural statistics. 
Source: A.B.S. " Value of Agricultural Commodities Produced, Tasmania 1980-81" 
Hence, the interest 	 in research into the structure of the 
industries 	 appears to warrant more than values alone might 
indicate. 	 Furthermore, as the blackcurrant crop has been the 
predominate industry amongst the various soft fruits, as shown in 
Table 1, the current thesis shall focus upon that industry. The 
dominance of blackcurrants can be seen to be under pressure from 
raspberries in recent years, but from a regional point-of-view 
Tasmania alone supplies the domestic blackcurrant market, whereas 
raspberries are produced on the mainland of Australia. Thus, to 
say "the Tasmanian blackcurrant industry" implies "the Australian 
blackcurrant industry" at least on the supply side of the market. 
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine the factors 
affecting 	 the demand for and the supply of blackcurrants in 
Tasmania, to measure the strength of the various influences, to 
assess the usefulness of such results in making pricing decisions, 
and to assess the performance of the statutory marketing board for 
the soft fruit industry, the Soft Fruit Industry Board. 
1:2-Structure of the Tasmanian industry  
The geographical 	 location of the 	 industry, as mentioned 
above, 	 lies 	 predominately 	 in southern Tasmania. 	 Table 3 
illustrates 	 the number of 	 establishments, area under cultivation, 
and 	 production for a recent year by local government area. 
Production of 	 blackcurrants (as well as other berry fruits) has 
tended 	 to be associated with production of other mixed farm 
produce. 	 Part-time and hobby farming are also characteristics of 
the 	 industry, 	 as only approximately 35 percent of the _total 
production 	 is derived from "dedicated" 	 berry farms (Edwards, 
1973). 
4 
Cultivation techniques have tended to be traditional methods 
yielding high production per hectare, but at high costs per tonne. 
Technological advances have been forthcoming, especially with 
regards 	 to mechanical harvesting. 	 However, the feasibility of 
mechanical harvesting is dependent upon the location, as well as 
TABLE 3 
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION 1974-75  
LOCAL GOVT 
AREA NO. 	HOLDINGS 
NON-BEARING 
AREA 
(HA) 
BEARING 
AREA 
(HA) 
PRODN 
(TNE) 
Glenorchy 13 3 8 28 
Esperence 6 2 3 18 
Huon 44 "9 26 129 
Kingborough 59 6 43 171 
New Norfolk 67 17 68 379 
Port Cygnet 18 6 10 35 
N. 	Central (Tamar) 3 3 0 0 
N. West 2 0 0 0 
N. East 2 4 0 0 
Hamilton 26 5 55 318 
West 2 0 0 0 
Total 249 96 228 1086 
Source: 	 A.B.S.,"Fruit Production, Tasmania, 1974-75". 
5 
the size, 	 of the blackcurrant plantation. 	 That is, 	 mechanical 
harvesters 	 cannot be used on the hilly terrain with which 
blackcurrant 	 plantations 	 have 	 typically 	 been 	 associated. 
Furthermore, it has been estimated that the plantations must be of 
at least 10 hectares before a harvester could become profitable to 
a sole operator (I.A.C., 1981). 
However, the trend emerging is one where large producers are 
exploiting the economies of size in moving to large scale 
production dependent upon mechanical harvesting. Data illustrates 
that for the 1981/82 season 85.4% of the crop of blackcurrants was 
produced 	 by growers who produced over 5 tonnes. More indicative 
is 	 the fact that five or six growers each produce in the range of 
40 to 50 tonnes per year (Soft Fruit Industry Board data). 
There are only two major processors of blackcurrants in 
Tasmania, 	 those being Cascade Cordials Pty. Ltd. and Clements and 
Marshall 	 Pty. Ltd. 	 Cascade have established long-term contracts 
with 	 blackcurrant growers, 	 thus supplying their needs for the 
production of "Ultra-C" blackcurrant juice. 
Clements and Marshall act principally as an agent whereby 
fruit 	 is 	 juiced 	 then sold to Anchor Foods Pty. Ltd. of South 
Australia, 	 who market the ."Anchor" 	 brand of blackcurrant juice. 
Other processors 	 are also provided with blackcurrants in block 
frozen form by Clements and Marshall. 
The major usage of Tasmanian blackcurrants, then, 	 is the 
production 	 of 	 juice. 	 As 	 mentioned, 	 there 	 are two major 
6 
domestically produced products which compete against Beecham Foods 
Ltd. 's "Ribena" blackcurrant extract. Beecham bottle Ribena 
domestically but source their blackcurrant content externally due 
to the lack of a processing plant within Australia. It is 
understood that blackcurrant extract is the product of a different 
process than that used in juice production. 
minor usage of blackcurrants is in the production of jam. 
However, jam has been said to be a diminishing outlet due to 
consumer attitudes and the relative cost of berry fruit compared 
to stone fruit (Dr. R. Clarke, private interview). Henry 
Jones-IXL produce a blackcurrant jam, as do Cottee's and Monbulk. 
The marketing of blackcurrants in Tasmania comes under the 
auspices of the Soft Fruit Industry Board (SFIB), a statutory body 
set up 	 by Tasmanian government under the Soft Fruit Industry Act 
1972. 	 The Board consists of an equal number of grower and 
processor 	 representatives, 	 an 	 independent chairman, 	 and a 
secretary. 
Control by the SFIB over the industry is limited to the 
amount of the crop to be disposed to the processing firms, that is 
there is 	 no control over the fresh produce side of the market. 
However, 	 the portion of Tasmanian blackcurrants going to the fresh 
produce market has been estimated to be approximately two percent 
of the total crop (Dept. of Agriculture, Tasmania). Thus, for all 
intents and purposes, the SFIB can be said to exert dominance over 
the industry. 
More specifically, 	 the SFIB is 	 empowered to require 
registration of producers and processors, with an annual license 
to 	 trade blackcurrants to be issued. 	 However, 	 the main purpose 
7 
for the 	 existence of the SFIB is to set prices. 	 Therefore, its 
dominance of 	 the industry is in this regard, where in fact the 
board 	 effectively becomes an arbitration council for the use of 
the producers 	 and processors in setting prices. 	 The result of 
this 	 arbitration system is a minimum price payable ex-farm gate, 
for that season's produce. 
Pricing of blackcurrants prior to the introduction of the 
Soft Fruit Industry Board was not statutorily enforced. However, 
minimum prices for fruit were announced each year by the Fruit 
Industry Sugar Concession Committee as qualification for rebates 
on 	 the price of sugar used in manufacture. This domestic sugar 
rebate is 	 payable on the sugar content of all fruit manufactures 
including blackcurrant products. 
Government assistance takes the form of tariff protection as 
recommended in the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) report 
"Fruit and Fruit Products." These recommendations have been 
estimated by the IAC to provide an effective protection rate of 10 
percent to the berry fruit industries 1981)-.- 
More specifically, the tariff protection applies to imports 
berry fruit juice at an ad valorem rate of 10 percent in 
general, with 	 juice from New Zealand being admitted duty free. 
Under 	 the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
continued under 	 Closer Economic Relations between Australia and 
New Zealand 	 (CER) imports of fresh or frozen berry fruit are duty 
free sourced 	 from New Zealand but dutiable at two percent sourced 
from elsewhere. 
8 
In addition to this tariff protection, in 1983 the growers 
of berry fruits have been given a bounty amounting to $100 per 
tonne of berry fruit going to the processing market. This bounty 
has been limited to a five year duration. 
Finally, and perhaps most important in terms of protection 
for the industry, is the existance of a sales tax exemption for 
the users of domestic blackcurrant juice which hinges upon a local 
contents scheme. That is, the end uses of blackcurrant juice are 
exempt from a 20% sales tax if the local blackcurrant content was 
at least 25% of the total by volume. In the 1983 Federal Budget 
the term "local" was redefined to include juice from New Zealand, 
in the spirit of CER. 	 Section (6.3) investigates the implications 
of the protective structure of the industry in more detail. 	 It is 
interesting to note that a relevant I.A.C. report was prepared in 
1981 	 concerning (amongst others) the blackcurrant industry. A 
personal 	 communication with the IAC on the question of the impact 
of 	 such a local content scheme was met with the reply that the 
sales tax exemption was not considered to be significant for these 
industries (I.A.C., personal communication). 
1.3 Structure of the New Zealand industry  
The New Zealand blackcurrant industry has emerged in the 
last 	 five years as the chief source of competition to the 
Tasmanian industry. 	 In fact it has been stated by the Soft Fruit 
Industry Board 	 (personal communication) that the emergence of New 
Zealand 	 as a 	 major blackcurrant producer was 	 due to the 
encouragement 	 made 	 by 	 Cascade 	 Cordials 	 Pty. 	 Ltd. 	 This 
encouragement 	 came at a time when the Australian demand for 
blackcurrants was not being satisfied by domestic production. 
9 
The recent developments in the New Zealand industry can be 
seen in the data presented in Table 4. 	 From 1967-68 to 1977-78 the 
industry 	 appeared to be relatively 	 stable. Total area under 
cultivation doubled in size over this period, although the number 
of growers only increased marginally. However, begining 1978-79 
the industry began growing at a rate which led to a sevenfold 
increase in area and a threefold increase in number of growers by 
the end of 1981-82. Total production increased over this period, 
TABLE 4 
NEW ZEALAND BLACKCURRANT INDUSTRY STATISTICS  
YEAR NO. 
AREA 
(ha) 
FRESH 
(tne) 
PROCESS 
(tne) 
TOTAL 
(tne) 
YIELD 
(tne/ha) 
PRICE 
($NZ) 
EXPORTS 
(tne) 
67-68 68 105 157 66 223 2.12 
68-69' 71 110 71 152 223 2.03 
69-70 67 123 90 119 209 1.71 
70-71 76 153 131 88 219 1.43 
71-72 80 200 89 222 311 1.56 
72-73 78 221 144 202 346 1.57 
73-74 79 335 99 201 300 0.90 
14 - 10 i% li.10 141 400  
10 - 10 na IJI 202 281 483 3.69 0.82 225 
76-77 84 160 145 365 510 3.19 0.98 250 
77-78 . 76 194 66 619 685 3.53 1.05 387 
78-79 89 311 134 615 749 2.41 0.96 558 
79-80 177 778 94 743 837 1.08 0.82 111 
80-81 224 1368 75 115.8 1233 0.90 1.24 43 
81-82 na 1449 na 2347 2347 1.62 na na 
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, NEW ZEALAND 
10 
but 	 at a reduced rate due to the lag between planting and 
harvesting. 	 As mentioned above, it appears that the exports to 
Australia during the period 1975-76 to 1978-79 might have had an 
influence upon the subsequent plantings in 1978-79 to 1981-82. The 
size of holdings in New Zealand are presented in Table Five and 
for Tasmania in Table Six. It is apparent that the size of the 
average plantation is larger in New Zealand than in Tasmania, with 
the majority of area (78%) being in plantations of greater than 
six hectares, 	 but held by only 34% of the growers. Yields per 
hectare 	 have been lower in New Zealand than in Tasmania. However, 
this phenomena, at least in the last few years, must be seen as 
symptomatic of the increase in area under cultivation which had 
not come into full production. 
There are a number of export assistance schemes operating in 
New Zealand, those being the Export Performance Taxation Incentive 
(EPTI), the Export Manufacturing investment Allowance (EMIA), and 
the 	 Export Market Development Grant 	 (EMDG). 	 The 	 EPTI allows a 
taxation credit 	 for the sale of processed exports based upon an 
export 	 classification 	 (banding) 	 scheme. 	 Section 	 (-6.3.2) 
quantifies the 	 incentive for blackcurrant products and provides 
more information 	 on this incentive. 	 The EMIA is based upon the 
proportion of production which has been exported, while the EMDG 
encourages 'exports to new markets. 	 These two incentives have not 
been quantifiable, 	 as they relate primarily to individual company 
policies, 	 e.g. 	 asset acquisition decisions, which are difficult to 
generalise. 	 It has been stated that the EPTI 	 is the most 
significant 	 incentive (New Zealand Dept. 	 of Trade and Industry, 
private communication). 
11 
Table 5 
New Zealand Blackcurrant Plantations  
No. of Farms Size (Ha) % of Farms 
 
604 < 1.2 56.6 
321 1.2 - 6 30.6 
79 >6 7.4 
58 Not Available 5.4 
Source: E. Beaumont, "Closer Economic Relations (CER) with New 
Zealand and the Tasmanian Apple & Berry Fruit Industries," 
unpublished paper, Australian Institute of Agricultural 
Science, p. 3.3. 
Table 6 
Tasmanian Blackcurrant Production 1981-82  
Range Number of Production 
(tne.) Growers (tne.)  
0-1.9 94 67.0 
2-4.9 30 93.0 
5-9.9 23 148.2 
10-19.9 15 220.6 
20-29.9 6 142.7 
30-39.9 2 68.7 
40-49.9 5 214.9 
50 & over 2 141.9 
Total 177 1097.0 
Source: Soft Fruit Industry Board Data 
12 
In a survey of 	 the •New Zealand industry, Langford and 
Mavromatis 	 (New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
1981) 	 characterise the industry as being made up of several 
cooperatives 	 of growers, processing companies, exporters, and 
government 	 departments. 	 The common connection between these 
groups 	 is a body known as the Blackcurrant Market Development 
Council. 	 This council acts on behalf of the industry and is 
responsible 	 for action on problem areas such as marketing 
strategies, 	 production problems and communications between the 
diverse groups involved in the industry. However, the Council has 
no statutory authority with regard to price, production controls, 
or marketing. 
1.4 Other Major Producers of Blackcurrants  
Unfortunately, 	 data 	 availablility 	 for 	 international 
production and 	 consumption of blackcurrants are not published in 
any 	 consistent manner. 	 Langford and Mavromatis have published 
statistics, 	 however, 	 which allow 	 conclusions to 	 be drawn 
concerning 	 the major producing countries of the world and the 
relative 	 size of the Tasmanian industry in comparative terms. 
Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the major producers. It is obvious 
by comparison that the Tasmanian industry, along with that of New 
Zealand, are relatively minor producers of blackcurrants. 
Although price data was not available from major producing 
countries, any differences in price levels between Australian and 
the "world" price are assumed to reflect transportation costs and 
differences in protective levels imposed by various countries. 
13 
TABLE 7 
EAST EUROPEAN CURRANT PRODUCTION  
1977  
'000 
COUNTRY TONNES 
Bulgaria 1.3 
Czechoslavakia 16.4 
East Germany 20.0 
Hungary 10.0 
Poland 85.0 
Yugoslavia 10.0 
Source: Langford & Mavromatis, 1981. 
TABLE 8 
U.K. BLACKCURRANT PRODUCTION 
YEAR AREA PRODN YIELD PRICE 
(HA) ('000 T) (T/HA) (STL./T) 
1970 4301 20.4 4.74 167.36 
1971 3833 23.1 6.03 229.50 
1972 3809 26.2 6.88 204.80 
1973 3880 21.1 5.44 266.00 
1974 4028 22.9 5.69 293.70 
1975 4136 23.8 5.75 248.60 
1976 3909 17.7 4.53 419.50 
1977 3792 8.4 2.22 916.90 
1978 3879 17.7 4.67 756.60 
1979 4091 -- 21.7 5.30 517.20 
Source: Langford & Mavromatis, 1981 
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1.5 A Summary of the Institutional Features  
At 	 this 	 point it 	 is appropriate to recapitulate 	 by 
summarising 	 the 	 institutional 	 features 	 of 	 the Tasmanian 
blackcurrant industry. 	 As these features will become encapsulated 
in 	 a model at a later stage in this thesis, this summary will 
provide a criteria for model selection. 
Briefly, the supply side of the industry is characterised by 
a 	 large number of producer of a homogeneous product. The nature 
of the 	 blackcurrant is perennial with an average gestation lag of 
approximately 	 four years. 	 Due to the perennial nature and 
combined 	 with the long period between planting decisions and 
harvesting, 	 it appears that producers' expectations concerning the 
profitability of 	 the product are important determinants of area 
under 	 planting, that is supply. The gestation lag also indicates 
• that 	 it is impossible for producers to adjust 	 their production to 
long-run 	 desired levels within one year, and hence, a partial 
adjustment mechanism is suggested. 
The demand side is characterised by a small number of 
processors. 	 The fruit purchased is generally juiced then block 
frozen and stored until such time as required by production. 	 The 
predominant use of 	 the fruit is in the manufacture of juice, with 
a minor 	 use being for jam production. The major processor has 
offered 	 long-term contracts 	 to attract production, the terms of 
which 	 state the willingness of the processor to accept all 
qunatities produced under contract at the ruling price. 
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The price of blackcurrants has been regulated by the Soft 
Fruit Industry Board since its inception in 1972. The Board is 
made up of equal numbers of producer and processor representatives 
with an independent chairman. Board activities also encompass 
quality standards, registration of producers and processors, and 
other non-trading activities. Prior to 1972 the ninimum prices 
were announced by the Fruit Industry Sugar Concession Committee. 
Various government policies apply to the industry. An IAC 
recommendation (1981) gave the producers of blackcurrants a $100 
per tonne bounty. Closer Economic Relations affected the tariff 
structure 	 for imports of blackcurrant fruit and concentrated 
juices. 	 Appendix 1 provides more explicit information on C.E.R. 
In 	 the spirit of C.E.R. a sales tax exemption for users of local 
blackcurrant juice 	 was recently modified to include fruit juice 
from New Zealand. 
Tasmania accounts for a small proportion of world production 
of blackcurrants. Although total production statistics on a 
world-wide basis are not available, leading producers include east 
European countries and the United Kingdom. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SOFT FRUIT INDUSTRY BOARD AND REGULATION 
2.1 The Economics of Marketing Boards  
In this section the economic aspects of marketing boards 
will be discussed with reference to the Soft Fruit Industry Board. 
The economics of marketing boards falls under the broad 
heading of 	 the economics of regulation. 	 Due to fluctuations in 
agricultural 	 prices, 	 farmers and producers have sought relief from 
the consequent fluctuations in their incomes by exerting political 
pressure upon governments. One such outcome of this political 
pressure has been the establishment of statutory marketing boards. 
The traditional view of regulation, that 	 termed "the public 
interest" 	 theory of regulation by Posner (1974, p.336) states that 
principle government interventions: 
...were simply 	 responses of 'government to 	 public 
demands for the rectification of palpable and 
remediable inefficiencies and inequities in the 
operation of the free market. 	 Behind each scheme 
of 	 regulation 	 could 	 be 	 discerned a market 
imperfection, 	 the existence of which supplied a 
justification for some regulation assumed 
to operate effectively and without cost. 
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By 	 assuming that the government is impartial 	 in rectifying 
inequities, 	 the distributional aspects of government intervention 
are avoided under this theory of regulation. The allocative 
efficiency questions can be examined with the aim of correcting 
for the market failure through intervention. 
The traditional classification of market failure is given by 
Bator (1957): 
a. failure by existence (no price for the output); 
b. failure 	 by signal 	 (non-optimal price for the 
output); 
c. failure 	 by incentive 	 (negative profits at 
the optimal price; 
d. failure by structure (no perfectly competitive 
market); 
e. failure 	 by 	 enforcement 	 (arbitrary legal 
imperfections). 
Seiper 	 (1982) has described 	 various barriers to the 
efficient 	 working of agricultural 	 markets which can illustrate 
some 	 of the above classifications of market failure, and which 
have 	 been used to justify market 	 intervention 	 in Australian 
agriculture. 	 Firstly, 	 the existence of a large number of 
intermediaries typical 	 of the marketing of agricultural produce 
can 	 obscure the price mechanism from the producer. 	 Price signals 
given 	 to the producer should reflect conditions in 	 the product's 
final 	 market. 	 According to Bator's 	 classification, failure is by 
signal. 
Secondly, the market for an agricultural product may fail 
from 	 the existence of imperfect competition. 	 Monopsonistic 
exploitation 	 is 	 often 	 cited-: 	 ,-,;Tt.,-0i01:eirni-,441 agriculture, for 
example when farmers sell to large, highly concentrated processing 
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firms. 	 Government intervention on 	 this count is aimed at 
equalising the 	 bargaining power of the farmers with that of the 
processing firms. 	 Various other forms of intervention are used to 
protect consumers and producers from the effects of market power 
by 	 processors, 	 including standards of labelling and packaging, 
food standards, 	 etc. 	 In all of these cases market failure is by 
structure. 
Thirdly, the market for an agricultural product may fail due 
to inertia, 	 inefficiency, or lack of innovation by marketers and 
distributors. 	 Intervention by government in this case has been 
through vehicles such as marketing boards. Market failure is by 
existence. 
Fourthly, agricultural markets may fail due to the lack of 
information, that is the existence of risk or uncertainty. 
Intervention to reduce this form of inefficiency is evident by the 
number of government agencies which support agricultural 
production, 	 including 	 marketing 	 boards, 	 state agricultural 
departments, 	 the 	 Bureau 	 of 	 Agricultural 	 Economics, 	 etc. 
Uncertainty, 	 as applied to agricultural 	 products usually reflects 
the 	 lack of adequate 	 insurance markets. Quiggin and Anderson 
(1979) 	 point 	 out that producers are faced with three types of 
risk: 
a. risk about the price they receive; 
b. risk about factors affecting the relationship 
between planned total output and actual total 
output, e.g. droughts, epidemics; 
c. risk about factors affecting their own output 
only, . 	 e.g. 	 local 	 weather, 	 personal 
--r'., • liv,:inageilleht! 
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Finally, 	 markets may 	 fail due 	 to the 	 presence of 
governmental 	 intervention 	 elsewhere in the economy. 	 In this case 
foreign 	 government policy could impact on local agricultural 
industries. 	 Protective measures are 	 examples of government 
intervention in this instance. 	 Market failure is by enforcement. 
The traditional public interest theory of regulation, as . 
noted above, has assumed away any distributional considerations in 
its 	 explanation of why governments 	 intervene into markets. 
Stigler 	 (1971) developed an 	 alternative, 	 later termed the 
"positive theory of regulation." Stigler (1971,p.4) observed 	 that 
the 	 coercive powers of a government could be used by an industry 
to 	 increase 	 its profitability. 	 It 	 is therefore necessary 
according to Stigler to view intervention 	 in terms of political 
coalitions, whereby 	 intervention is the product of a political 
bargain between various interested parties. 
Viewing intervention basically as a product, it becomes 
apparent that 	 there should be a market in which this product is 
bought 	 and 	 sold. 	 Peltzman 	 (1976,p.212) 	 stated 	 that 	 from an 
intervention point-of-view: 
The 	 essential commodity being transacted in the 
political market is a transfer of wealth, with 
constituents on the demand side and their political 
representatives on the supply side. Viewed in this 
way the market here, as elsewhere, will distribute 
ore of the good to those whose effective demand is 
highest. 
A distributive theory of regulation should have something to 
say 	 about the conditions which allow certain groups to obtain 
regulation. 	 Stigler mentions a few conditions drawing from the 
theory- 	 of 	 cartels 	 which 	 could 	 influence  
effectiveness 	 of a group in obtaining favourable regulation. 
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Firstly, 	 the size of the group was pointed out as a relevant 
factor. 	 In this regard Stigler mentioned that there would be a 
law of diminishing return to group size in politics. To begin. 
with the group itself will be a minority in terms of the size of 
the group in proportion to the population as a whole. With the 
voting on a particular issue, a voter will incur costs for 
acquiring information on the consequences of the issue. A voter 
will not generally incur such costs if the size of his interest is 
small. Consequently, those with a small stake in the matter, 
although 	 quite possibly representing a majority 	 in numbers 
overall, may 	 not defeat a policy against their best interests, as 
they will be unaware of the policy's implications. 
A further limitation to the size of the group is due to the 
costs of organisation. The group must organise itself to find and. 
support the politician or political party which will implement the 
desired policies of the group. As the group size increases, the 
total 	 per capita value of the desired policy declines, again 
supporting the concept of a diminishing return to group size. 
A second condition pointed out by Stigler was that the 
degree of concentration of the group or industry would be a factor 
in the successful acquisition of regulation. 	 Stigler pointed out 
that 	 the more highly concentrated industries would have more 
resources at 	 its disposal which could be invested in acquiring 
favourable 	 regulation. 	 However, 	 Posner (1974) 	 pointed out that 
there 	 should be an inverse relationship between the degree of 
concentration 	 and regulation, 	 as a cartel may be a less costly 
alternative 	 to 	 regulat, 	 .,1Wh!e'm Ali.number_of _participants is 
small. 
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A final condition for obtaining regulation pointed out by 
Stigler was the absense of a cohesive opposition to the proposed 
regulation. This condition again is supported by condition one 
above, 	 in 	 that if a voter has only a small stake in the question 
he 	 will not incur the cost of acquiring information about a 
proposed policy, a particular candidate, or a particular political 
party. 	 If the individual voters, however, can organise themselves 
around the 	 law of diminishing returns, 	 an effective opposition 
campaign might defeat a proposition. 
It is apparent from this brief survey that it is possible to 
adopt either a positive or public interest approach to the problems 
of the industry under study. While a discussion of distributional 
questions will be undertaken at a later point in this thesis, it 
should be ,pointed out that a public interest approach will be used 
to model the Tasmanian blackcurrant industry. 
2.2 Types of Marketing Boards_ 
In 	 this 	 section marketing boards shall be catagorised, 
providing a 	 criterion 	 for classification of the activities of the 
,Soft. 	 Fruit 	 Industry Board, 	 which will 	 be undertaken in the 
subsequent section. 	 A marketing board can be defined as a public 
body which has been delegated under 	 its enabling legislation 
various 	 legal 	 powers 	 which 	 it holds compulsorily over 	 the 
producers of that particular commodity. 	 In some cases the 
processors are 	 also bound by the marketing board. 	 A marketing 
['bar' 	 s '.&i:st-inct from growers 	cooperatives 'primarily 	 in 	 the 
power 	 of compulsion held by the 	 board. 	 By its nature a 
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Cooperative is a voluntary agreement which has 	 no power of 
enforcement. 	 A 	 marketing board is also distinct from direct 
government intervention 	 in that the board has been delegated a 
degree of authority for the commodity. 	 Along with the delegated 
authority 	 comes an element of autonomy of management which can 
separate the board from the government. 
Veeman (1972) 	 has classified the 	 types of statutory 
marketing 	 boards into two major types: non-trading boards and 
trading 	 boards. 	 Within these two major classifications the 
following subdivisions were denoted: non-trading boards could be 
advisory 	 and promotional, 	 regulatory, or stabilisation; trading 
boards could be stabilisation, export monopoly, or domestic 
monopoly. The designation of a particular board depended largely 
upon the enabling legislation, which usually defined the functions 
and limits of the board. According to this classification system 
the functions of the different types of boards roughly conforms to 
the following description. 
Non-trading advisory and promotion boards, as the name 
indicates 	 do not 	 trade 	 in 	 the 	 particular commodity. 	 Their 
predominant purpose is to conduct market research, 	 promote sales 
campaigns, and to develop new uses for markets for the product. 
This type of board is usually funded by a levy on the sales of the 
commodity. 
Non-trading regulatory boards, again, 	 do not trade in the 
commodity 	 but do develop quality standards or grading systems. 
Enforcement of the standards is usually:,,gliii4TAIK .by the right to 
inspect 	 premises carrying out production. 	 Furthermore, licensing 
23 
requirements 	 for producers, handlers, 	 and processors can be a 
characteristic of the powers of this type of board. 
Non-trading stabilisation boards attempt to stabilise the 
price of the commodity by various means such as: administering the 
trading price; by using reserve levy funds to subsidise prices 
when necessary; by supply management; or by import controls. 
Trading stabilisation boards usually own marketing and 
storage 	 facilities. 	 By entering the market, the board can 
stabilise price through purchasing or selling "buffer" stocks. 	 In 
this 	 case the marketing authority would attempt to buy its buffer 
stock in 	 a market characterised by a falling price while selling 
its stock in an increasing market. 
Export monopoly and domestic monopoly boards are both 
characterised as being the stile buyer and seller for a particular 
commodity, either for, respectively, export sales or domestic 
whether prices yielding monopoly profits would be permitted. 
2.3 Soft Fruit industry Acts of 1972 and 1973  
The legislation which set up the Soft Fruit 	 Industry Board 
was the Soft Fruit Industry Act of 1972. 	 This Act was amended in 
1973. 	 The legislation was typical of the enabling legislation for 
marketing 	 boards as described by Veeman (1972) and Campbell & 
Fisher 	 (1982). 	 In, this section 	 the Act (as amended) will be 
discussed. 
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Part One of the Act defined relevant terms. 	 An important 
term was the definition of soft fruit to include: 	 strawberries; 
raspberries; 	 blackcurrants; gooseberries; and fruit of the Rubus 
genus. 	 Also defined were a soft fruit processing business which 
was taken to mean a business involving the processing of any kind 
of 	 soft fruit, or the buying of any kind of soft fruit for the 
purpose of sale to a processing firm. Processing was taken to 
include the canning or bottling; the extraction of juice; use for 
the manufacture of any substance; treating for the purpose of 
preserving in a state fit for human consumption. 
Part Two of the Act established the Soft Fruit Industry 
Board 	 and defined the composition of its members and specified 
some of its powers. The composition of the Board included an 
independent Chairman, two producer members, two processor members, 
deputies for the producer and processor members, and a secretary. 
The Board members are tenured for a period of three years and are 
appointed by the Governor of Tasmania. The Chairman, in addition 
to presiding at meetings of the Board, may exercise a casting vote 
if there is an equality of votes on a matter, but may not vote 
otherwise. 
The powers delegated to the -Board as described in Section 
Two 	 relate mainly 	 to non-trading activities. 	 These powers 
include: 	 advising the Minister for Primary industry on any matters 
Concerning the 	 administration of the Act; making recommendations 
or representations 	 to any authority or body on any matter that 
concerns 	 the interests of the producers or processors of soft 
fruit; 	 taking 	 action on the promotion of the use of soft fruit; 
information concerning soft fruit; and 
or standards for any type of soft fruit. 
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Part Three of the Act spells out the Board's powers over the 
Industry. 	 In this section the registration of processors and 
licensing of producers is detailed. In essence, a soft fruit 
processor must be registered by the Board before he is permitted 
to become party to a sale of soft fruit. Upon notification from a 
registered processor that he is willing to purchase a quantity of 
soft fruit, licenses are issued by the Board to producers for the 
supply of that quantity. The issuance of a license to a producer 
is tantamount to a contract and is binding upon all parties to the 
"production agreement." 
Section 19 delineates the Board's authority to set prices 
for the industry along with any other conditions and terms which 
it might consider to be appropriate. 	 This section, then, embodies 
the 	 Board's monopoly pricing powers in that it may determine the 
price both to the processor and producer. 
Intervention into a market, as shown above, can be justified' 
on 	 several 	 grounds, 	 for example: 	 if particular individuals or 
groups 	 exploit 	 market 	 power; 	 if 	 there 	 are significant 
externalities 	 in production or consumption: if the distribution of 
income is regarded to be inequitable. 
For the Tasmanian soft fruit industry, all of the conditions 
could be viewed as relevant at the time the Act was conceived. 	 In 
particular, 	 as noted above, the duopsonistic nature of the demand 
side indicates 	 the potential for the exploitation of growers by 
Cascade and Clements and MarShall"--toa4,gder. becoming the 
dominant processor, that role was played by Henry Jones and Co. 
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Economies-of-scale 	 were 	 the 	 possible 	 production 
externalities 	 which could 	 have been 	 promoted through the 
establishment 	 of a marketing authority. Mechanical harvesting 
technology was becoming available at this stage. However, the 
adaption of this technology to Tasmanian conditions required the 
relocation of production from the small hill-sides traditionally 
associated with diversified farms to specialised plantations of at 
least 10 hectares located on flat land. The riskiness of such a 
venture would have been apparent due to the relatively high cost 
of establishing a "dedicated" berry farm. 
The principle 	 location of soft 	 fruit production, 	 as 
mentioned above, was the Huon Valley. This setting provided the 
third criteria for government intervention, due to the declining 
importance of the apple and pear industriei- in that area. During 
debate on the Soft Fruit Industry bill, in speaking for the bill, 
the member for Franklin, Mr. Clark, reinforced the concern for the 
stabilisation of income to the Huon Valley by noting that the 
area's farmers should diversify into the production of soft fruit, 
beef, and vegetables. Clark indicated that "each is a potential 
industry for the area." (Mercury Extracts, 1972) 
It appears from the above conditions of the industry at the 
time 	 that the market was not functioning so as to allocate 
resources properly. 	 In a sense there appeared to exist market 
failure due to incorrect signals given to participants. 	 That is, 
the market price was not sufficient to compensate the producers of 
soft 	 fruit, 	 bFackbiktrii611§ ,- :''.i4articulax, to 	 bear the risk of 
reestablishing 	 their enterprises 	 into 	 specialised, large-scale 
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plantations 	 which could make use of the mechanical harvesting 
technology. 	 Furthermore, 	 the risk of entry into an "exploited" 
market would have presumably been built into the cost structure of 
a potential 	 soft fruit grower, again adding to the price which 
would 	 have needed to be received to call forth the needed 
production. 
2.4 Evaluation of Marketing Boards  
In this section guide-lines for evaluation of marketing 
boards will be discussed. 
In a recent address Hocking (1985) stated that due to the 
diversity of marketing arrangements for agricultural products, the 
assessment of a particular statutory authority must be made with 
respect to its underlying enabling legislation. Furthermore, the 
assessment 	 should highlight the intentions of establishing the 
marketing board, 	 the potential for meeting its objectives, and the 
success or failure of achieving its objectives. 
It has been pointed out above that the Soft Fruit 	 Industry 
Board was established under producer pressure to reduce the price 
associated 	 risks involved in developing large, specialised berry 
fruit 	 plantations. 	 The Board was 	 implicitly 	 charged 	 with 
stabilising 	 the 	 industry by attempting 	 to match the supply of 
berry fruit to the perceived demand by processors. 
The enabling legislation as shown above allowed the Board to 
efl"et'tg5kr 	 .objectives 	 through 	 its price fixing and 
licensing powers 	 over berry fruit production 	 in Tasmania. 	 What 
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was 	 left was the necessity for the Board to forecast the 
market-clearing price. 
A problem with state marketing boards which influences the 
abilities of the boards to meet their objectives occurs where the 
jurisdiction of 	 the board doesn't extend sufficiently to ensure 
compliance with its regulations. 	 For the SFIB this problem exists 
where processors 	 of soft fruit are located outside Tasmania. 	 In 
this case, 	 the processors are not constrained to trade with the 
Tasmanian industry. 
The effectiveness of a marketing board is frequently debated 
on the grounds that the board is not changing the situation which 
existed 	 before it came into existence. 	 That is, charges of 
"rubber 	 stamping" the market are made. 	 In this sense, any 
administrative costs associated with the board would be seen as 
unnecessary since the market would have been doing as well without 
the board. 
Blandy (1981) has considered the question of rubber stamping 
by 	 the Australian Arbitration Commission. 	 In his article, Blandy 
found that the wage structure for Australian 	 industries under the 
arbitration 	 system was not greatly different from the wage 
structure in the United Kingdom under a "free market" system of 
collective bargaining. Part of this reasoning by Blandy was on 
the basis of a study by Handcock and Hughes (1973) who computed a 
simple coefficient of correlation between the two countries' wage 
structure. As the coefficient of correlation was high (r=0.732) 
was 'taken 	 that 	 the 	 wage 	 results 	 under arbitirpn,..,w,e,r,er 
approximately the same as those of the "free market." 
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A similar test was performed for the blackcurrant industry 
to 	 quantify 	 the possibility of rubber stamping. 	 Data was 
available 	 for the New Zealand blackcurrant industry, which is 
characterised 	 as 	 a 	 non-administered 	 "free" 	 market. 	 The 
calculation of the correlation coefficient (r) between New 
Zealand's blackcurrant prices to the SFIB price series indicated a 
very low degree of correlation, with the coefficient being 0.0739. 
On the basis of this data, it seems apparent that the SFIB was not 
rubber stamping the market, but had exercised an influence over 
the pricing of blackcurrents. 
Judging the SFIB on the criterion of using its potential to 
meet its objectives of price stabilisation, the above test 
indicates that the Board is effectively using its price setting 
powers. 	 A further test of the effectiveness of the Soft Fruit 
Industry Board's 	 pricing powers can be made on the basis of an 
econometric model of the industry. 	 It is proposed that the model 
developed and estimated in later sections of this thesis be used in 
this regard'. 
Due to the comparatively recent introduction of the SFIB, 
there 	 exists an opportunity to compare market participants' 
reactions 	 to price changes under the conditions of both free 
markets 	 and of supported markets, 	 and hence, under differing 
• -degrees 	 of price uncertainty. 	 It is apparent that the price 
responsiveness of participants under supported markets should be 
more rapid than to free market prices as the level of riskiness 
associated with supported prices would be reduced. 
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The method of analysing this hypothesis will be to split the 
collected data into subsections corresponding to the existence (or 
otherwise) of the SFIB. The Chow test will be applied to the two 
sets of regression coefficients to formally test for differences 
which could imply institutional or structural changes due to the 
introduction'of the SFIB. 
2.5 The Measurement of Welfare Effects  
In attempting to evaluate the effects of policy changes on 
society, 	 it is apparent that some measurement of welfare needs to 
be 	 made. 	 Traditionally, 	 the measurement of 	 consumer's and 
producer's surplus 	 have been used in, this regard to value the 
change 	 in prices and quantities exchanged on the market after the 
imposition 	 of some policy. 	 In this context the policies of 
marketing boards can be evaluated. 
The traditional concept of the consumer's surplus arose from 
Marshall's (1920) notion that "the price which a person pays for a 
thing can never exceed, and seldom comes up to that which he would 
be willing to pay rather than go without it." Marshall's measure 
of consumer's surplus, then, is this difference between what the 
consumer actually pays for a product and what he would be willing 
to pay for, that is the area under the demand curve but above the 
price line. 
Similarly, the producer's surplus is derived from the idea 
of earning a "rent" on factors in the production of a product. 	 In 
this . 	 case-;'th'6 1. A. by -the- producer is higher than the 
.minimum 	 which he would be willing to 	 receive to produce his 
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output. 	 The area under the price line but above the supply curve 
defines the producer's surplus. 
The evaluation of a policy change is often couched in 
analysing 	 the changes in the above measures of surplus. 	 For 
example, 	 the introduction of a minimum price for a product can be 
analysed 	 by measuring the transfer of surplus from either the 
consumer to the producer or vice versa. Also important in this 
measure of welfare for some policies is the so-called "deadweight 
loss" in welfare. For example, a minimum pricing scheme where 
price is set above the competitive equilibrium price introduces an 
inefficiency 	 into the market, as at the higher price quantity 
traded is reduced. 	 Welfare is reduced because at the new quantity 
traded the 	 area under the demand curve and above the supply curve 
has been reduced. 
The use of the Marshallian surplus measures, however, is 
dependent upon the assumption that the marginal utility of income 
was constant. 	 The implication of this assumption is that because 
of a 	 price change for a commodity, the consumer's real income will 
be changed as well. 	 If the consumer's marginal utility of income 
is different 	 at different levels of 	 income, defining the surplus 
at- 	 the change in price times the quantity will incorrectly value 
the welfare gains or losses. 
Hicks (1946) developed alternative measures of surplus for 
the case where the marginal utility of income was not assumed to 
be constant. 	 Using indifference curves Hicks defined the concepts 
of 	 compensating and equivalent variations as measures of welfare. 
'4Iih-lit.pensating variation was defined as the maximum amoumt,,tkuj 
consumer would give up to remain on his original indifference 
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curve after a price fall. 	 The equivalent variation is that amount 
which a consumer would require to forego a price fall but enabling 
him to achieve the same gain in welfare as he would have received 
as a result of the price fall. The compensating and equivalent 
variations will only be the same when there is no income effect, 
that is when the marginal utility of income is constant. We have 
seen, though, that in this case the Marshallian measurement of 
surplus is appropriate and furthermore, equal to the compensating 
and equivalent variation measures. When the income effect is 
positive, the 	 consumer surplus will be less than the compensating 
variation, 	 which 	 itself will be 	 less 	 than the equivalent 
variation. When the income effect is negative the consumer 
surplus will again be underestimating the welfare change, however 
in this case the equivalent variation will be less than the 
compensating variation. 
The point of contention for empirical measurement of welfare 
using the Marshallian concept of consumer and producer surplus 
arises from the assumption of constant marginal utility of income. 
It is usual to consider this assumption to be valid in cases where 
the expenditure on the commodity is relatively small when compared 
to the total expendit-ure. 	 However, if the income from the sale of 
a 	 good forms a large portion of total revenue, the effect of a 
price change would be expected to be accompanied by some form of 
an income effect. 	 An example often cited in this 	 regard is the 
surplus attached to the supply of labour. 	 Given that most workers 
derive the 	 majority of their income from one type of labour, the 
change 	 in the rate paid for this labour would have a significant 
effect 	 on 	 the 	 individuals' 	 real 	 incQ*Pz,d-,71-;T-m::' 910.4.case 
agricultural 	 commodities, 	 non-diversified 	 establishments 	 would 
also be subject to significant income effects. 
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In the eventuality that income effects are assumed to be 
significant, 	 the use of the Marshallian measures are 	 less 
desirable 	 than the Hicksian measures, as the former underestimate 
the welfare 	 effect. 	 To obtain the Hicksian measures empirically 
it 	 would be necessary to estimate Hicksian income-compensated 
demand curves, 	 whereby the income effect of a price change had 
been 	 compensated 	 for. 	 In this 	 case the area 	 under the 
income-compensated demand curve but above the price line would 
correspond to the correct measure of the welfare. Although income 
effects May be assumed to be present, it is usual for agricultural 
policies to be evaluated in terms of changes in consumer & 
producer surpluses. 	 Varian (1978) 	 points out that the correct 
Hicksian 	 income-compensated demand curves and their associated 
measures of welfare are not empirically observable. Thus, 
applications using the Marshallian measures of surplus require the 
inclusion, according to Willig (1976), of an "apology" to the 
theoreticians 	 for 	 using an inappropriate measure. 	 In this thesis, 
as 	 is 	 usual practice 	 in empirical 	 applications, the Marshallian 
measures will 	 be used 	 to evaluate policy decisions, 	 assuming the 
income 	 effects are insignificant, given the diversified nature of 
blackcurrant establishments 	 in Tasmania, 	 as pointed out earlier 
f. p.3, supra.j. 
Nerlove (1958) has shown that under these usual assumptions, 
the elasticities of supply and demand can be used to measure the 
changes 	 in surplus caused by a change in a minimum pricing 
arrangement. 	 NerlOve has shown that the percentage change in 
surplus when 	 equildbrium value of the crop, can 
be expressed as: 
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(2.1) 	 Consumers' Surplus: 	 CS = x ( 1 - .5 x ed) 
ed 
(2.2) 	 Producers' Surplus: 	 PS = x - x2ed ( 1 + 	 5 	 ) 
es 
where elasticities are taken at their absolute values, and where 
x=g/P0. The net welfare effect is given in percentage terms as: 
ed (2.3) 	 CS - PS = .5x2ed ( 1 + 	 ). es 
It can be seen that if the price of a commodity is decreased, 	 the 
net welfare effect shall be positive, while for a price rise the 
effect will be negative. Also apparent in this analysis is the 
relative impact on the producers and consumers of the commodity. 
It can 	 be seen that the elasticity of supply and demand govern 
which 	 group absorbs the majority of the impact of the price 
change. 	 That 	 is, if 	 the elasticity of supply is less than the 
elasticity 	 of demand in absolute values, the producers of the 
commodity will 	 lose (gain) 	 more from a price increase (decrease) 
relative to the consumers of the commodity. 
This procedure for evaluation of policy changes will be used 
at a later point in this thesis to consider the effect of a change 
in the sales tax exemption for fruit juices, and shall be 
contrasted with the above-mentioned objectives of the Soft Fruit 
industry Board. 
The welfare implications of a minimum pricing scheme can be 
shown for a perfectly competitive industry by considering the 
changes in consumer and producer surpluses resulting from the move 
from an equilibrium price to the higher minimum price. Figure One 
	
basic .model 	 for a minimum pricing arrangement, 
assuming that the marginal utility of income is constant. 
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Prior to 	 the 	 introduction of a minimum price into the 
market, 	 the equilibrium position is given by the price OP* and 
the quantity 0Q*. 	 When the minimum price is proclaimed, there 
will be a misallocation 	 of resources 	 towards the industry 
resulting 	 in over-production given that the minimum price is 
effective. 	 This 	 is shown 	 in Figure 	 One by the price 0P1, 
which 	 would induce the supply 	 10Q2 and the demand 0Q1. 	 In 
conjunction 	 with 	 this over-production will be the existence of 
inequities in production. 	 Due 	 to 	 the 	 existence of the 
minimum 	 price, 	 producers whose marginal costs are less than or 
equal 	 to OP1  will be willing 	 to supply at that minimum price. 
However, as only 0Q1 units will be taken up by the market, 
there 	 will be a surplus of these suppliers, 	 which indicates 
the 	 necessity for some form 	 of rationing of production. 	 On 
efficiency grounds, 	 the production should be taken up by the 
most cost 	 effective producers, 	 i.e. those whose marginal costs 
are equal to or less than OP2. 
A-farther inefficiency generated by the minimum price is the 
above-mentioned 	 dead-weight 	 loss in 	 consumer and 	 producer 
surpluses. 	 It is clear from Figure One that for a minimum price 
set above 	 the competitive 	 equilibrium price, there is a transfer 
of 	 surplus from the consumer to the producer, amounting to the 
area 	 (P*pIAB). 	 However, 	 the 	 dead-weight 	 loss 	 in surplus is 
the area 	 (ABCD), 	 Made up of 	 the reduction in 	both consumer 
and producer surplus due to the reduced quantity demanded. 
A 
Q). 
A 
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FIGURE I: MINIMUM PRICING SCHEME 
CHAPTER III 
MODELLING APPROACHES 
3.1 Analytical Models  
A discussion of models 	 analytically specifying the causal 
relationships' 	 of 	 industry supply and 	 demand 	 shall 	 now be 
presented. 	 Ideally, 	 a review of models 	 previously specified for 
the 	 industry of 	 interest 	 should 	 be 	 included. 	 However, 	 a 
computer-aided 	 search of 	 the literature on blackcurrants only 
indicated 	 one model 	 relating 	 to 	 the 	 blackcurrant industry, a 
supply 	 response model 	 the U.. industry. 	 This model will be 
discussed below at the relevant point. 
With 	 this OUViOUS 	 lack of 	 literature to 	 build on, 	 it is 
intended 	 to develop a model 	 for 	 the Tasmanian ,blackcurrant 
industry 	 bv 	 reviewing 	 various 	 approaches 	 to 	 the modellingof 
agricultural 	 markets. 	 The approaches considered, here shall be the 
traditional 	 static 	 market 	 equilibrium 	 model, 	 the 	 naive 
expectations 	 (cobweb) 	 dynamic model, 	 the adaptive expectations 
model, and the rational expectations model. 
3-7 
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3.2 Model One: 	 Traditional Static Equilibrium Market Model 
For a price-taking profit maximising 	 producer it can be 
shown that the supply function of the individual producer is the 
marginal cost curve over the range where marginal cost is rising 
and is greater than, or equal to average variable cost. For 
prices lower than average variable cost, the supply function for 
the 	 producer is not defined. The traditional derivation Of supply 
comes from the producer's profit maximising output decision. 	 The 
producer seeks to set his output such that his profit is maximised 
subject 	 to his 	 production 	 function and a given cost funtion. 
Mathematically, 	 for a single output produced by N variable factors 
and one fixed factor, the problem is to maximise the function : 
•= PQ - E r.L. - K 	 (3.1) 1 1 
i=1 
subject to: Q = f(L 	 .,L ,K) 1" n' (3.2) 
where: P = price of the commodity; 
= quantity produced;  
r. = ith variable factor's wage rate; 1 L. = quantity of the ith variable factor; 
= cost of :he fixed factor. 
Substituting the production function into the profit function yields: 
•= Pf(L1,...,Ln,R) - 
	
	 riLi - K. 	 (3.3) 
i=1 
The first-order' 	 conditions obtained by maximising 	 this 
function with 	 respect 	 to 	 the variable input 	 show that a 	 profit 
maximiser will 	 employ a variable input until the marginal revenue 
product is equal to its wage rate, that is: 
9Tr = Pf' (L.,...,L,K
- 
) = r. L. 	 n 	 1 
(3.4) 
These expressions may be solved for the factor demand functions: 
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- L. = L. (P,r 	 ...,r ,K). n 
Substitution 	 of these N 	 factor demand functions into 	 the 
production function yields the producers supply function: 
Qs = f L (P,r 	 r K) 	 L (P r 	 r 1 	 1""' n' "*" n 	 1"." n, K) (3.6) 
or: 	 Qs = Qs(P,r1 n ,K). 
 (3.7) 
This function states that 	 the individual producer's supply 
decision is 	 based on the commodity price, N input prices, and the 
current 	 technology 	 (embodied by the fixed factor K). 	 The industry 
supply. 	 is derived as 	 the horizontal summation of the individual 
producers 	 supply functions, assuming technology and factor prices 
are 	 independent 	 of industry output. 	 The industry supply 	 function 
over m individual producers can be written, as: 
Q = E Q .(P,r 	 ,K) S 
	
	 Si 	 1 	 n i=1 
Given 	 upward 	 sloping 	 individual 	 supply functions, the industry 
supply 	 function 	 will be upward sloping in the absense of 	 external 
effects. 
For a perfectly competitive buyer of an input of production, 
the 	 demand 	 for 	 that 	 input 	 is derived from the demand for the 
produced output. 	 The input demand functions are determined from 
the 	 firm's 	 first-order 	 conditions, 	 solving 	 for 	 the quantity 
demanded 	 as 	 a 	 function of own price, output price, and other 
fact ,p-e 	 , • -rti=.e derivation 	 of the factor demand 	 functions as 
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shown above for the producer is identical for a profit maximising 
buyer of an input. Although the problem facing both the supplier 
and 	 the purchaser are couched 	 in identical terms, it must be 
remembered that 	 the output from one industry is (in this case) 
used 	 as an input into a different industry. The input demand 
function for the ith input by the jth user (analogous to the input 
demand functions derived above) are: 
Lij = L.j  (P,w 	 ,R) i (3.9) 
The aggregate demand for the ith input is obtained by summing the 
M individual users' input demand functions, i.e.: 
D. = D(L.) = Z L.. = E L..(P,w1 	 n 	 i=1,..., 	(3.10) 3=1 	 3=1 
It can be shown from the second-order conditions for a 
profit 	 maximum that the slope of the individual firm's factor 
demand 	 curve is always negative, given the assumptions of perfect 
competition. 	 Hence, 	 the 	 aggregate 	 demand 	 curve will be 
unambiguously downward sloping. 
To tring the two segments of the market together it is 
necessary to 	 postulate an equilibrium condition. Traditionally, 
the form of this identity is that quantity demanded and supplied 
at 	 each point 	 in time 	 are 	 equal, that is, the Market'clears. 
Wairas portrayed the market as obeying a "tatonnement" meahanism 
whereby the price was bid up or down until the equilibrium price 
was obtained and the market cleared. 
The traditional market model for a factor can be expressed 
by three equations in three endogenous variables (Qs, Q 
4 1 
Qs = Q (P,r1 	 n,K1) s  
Qd =  
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
d 	 Qs  (3.13) 
where: Qs = quantity supplied; 
Qd = quantity demanded; 
producers' output price; 
ri = producers' ith input price; 
OP = buyers ioutput price; 
wi = buyers' ith input price; 
K
-  
1 = producers' fixed factor cost; 
1(2 = buyers' fixed factor cost. 
Often 	 in the case 	 of agricultural markets there 	 is 
contention 	 concerning the 	 presence of 	 significant market power. 
1.n 	 the 	 Tasmanian blackcurrant industry, for example, growers have 
C harged 	 the 	 major processor with • exploitation. 	 It is appropriate, 
then, 	 to 	 consider the modelling of 	 monopsonistic demand 	 for an - 
input given a competitive supply of that input. 
A profit-maximising monopsonist does not "take the input 
price as 	 given, 	 as does a perfectly competitive buyer of a factor 
of 	 production. 	 Because the monopsonist faces 	 the market supply 
function, 	 he must pay more 	 for each additional unit purchased. 
The input level is set by maximisi.n-g'tthe pae.o,fmc'trion: 
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H = PQ - Er,L. - K i=1"L 1 (3.14) 
subject to: Q = f(L 	 ,L ,K) 1" n' (3.15) 
as shown above. 	 Substitution of the production function into the 
profit function yields: 
I = Pf(L 	 L R)-E r L. - K. n' 	 i i=1 
(3.16) 
The 	 first-order condition obtained by maximising 	 this 
function with 	 respect to the 	 variable input (whose price is now 
dependent upon the quantity demanded), i.e.: 
DH 	 Dr. (3.17 ) — = 	 - ri 	 Li = 0. DL. 1 
In 	 this 	 case, the monopsonist maximises profits by 
setting his 	 input 	 demand 	 for 	 the 	 ith factor 	 such that 	 the 
marginal 	 revenue 	 product 	 equals the marginal cost of that factor. 
The 	 exploitation 	 concept 	 arised 	 from the fact 	 that the marginal 
cost 	 is 	 less 	 than 	 the 	 price 	 paid 	 to 	 the factor. 	 The above 
first-order condition can be written as: 
DH 	 r. 1 _ ----=Pf'(1„..1,1q-r..— = 0. L.1'. 	 ' n' 	 1 
 
DL. 1 E. 
	
1 	 i 
where: ci= elasticity of supply of the ith factor. 
(3.18) 
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It 	 is 	 apparent 	 that 	 the profit 	 maximising input demand 
upon 	 supply 	 considerations. 	 Substitution of 	 the depends 
first-order conditions 	 into the production function and solving 
for the ith factor demand function yields: 
L. = f(13'111.'"rri'K'". 1 (3.19) 
This input demand function shows the quantity demanded of 
the 	 ith factor of production based on a given factor supply 
function 	 and 	 thus differs from the traditional concept of a cet. 
par. 	 "demand" 	 function where quantity demanded varies 	 with 
    
alternative prices. 
3.3 Model Two: Naive Expectations (Cobweb) Model  
The traditional model. presented above 	 is based on the 
asssumption of 	 instantaneous, non-storable production. 	 That is, 
the 	 economic . 
arrive 	 at 
corresponding 
next market day. 
	
agents are assumed to arrive at 	 the market place, 
tatonnement, 	 produce the 
market-clearing quantity, 	 then 	 go away until the 
the 	 equilibrium price 	 by 
However, 	 because of 	 lags 	 in 	 production, 	 t . has 	 been 
perceived that 	 the supply of an agricultural product may depend 
upon 	 the 	 price 	 in 	 a 	 previous 	 time period. 	 For example, time 
delays 	 between planting and harvest would imply that 	 the decision 
to plant 	 (and hence, to supply the commodity) was based upon the 
price 	 expected at harvest. 	 A naive extrapolation of expected 
prdc-&- ,.i7S .th:&-prgl;c!e- experienced at the time of 	 the decision. 	 So, 
in 	 its 	 most elementary state, the supply function 	 for a good with 
a one period "gestation" lag could be expressed as: 
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(3.20) S =  
where 	 pt-1 	 is the own price of the commodity in the previous 
per 
Assuming the demand and equilibrium functions hold as 
expressed in Model 1 above, the model has become a dynamic 
equilibrium model with lagged adjustment whereby, ceteris paribus, 
demand is a function of current price and supply is a function of 
the previous period's price. The model embodies a behavioural 
assumption, 	 however, 	 which requires 	 that supply equals demand. 
Thus, 	 price must 	 adjust 	 to clear 	 the market once the supply 
emerges upon 	 the market, 	 generating a time path of price as a 
function 	 of time which, due to oscillations around equilibrium, 
has been termed a "cobweb" model. 
'Ezekiel (1938), in his theoretical explanation of the cobweb 
model, 	 has pointed out three 	 implicit assumptions regarding the 
model. 	 He 	 states (p.272) 	 that the 	 model is 	 applicable only to 
commodities: 
(1) where 	 production is 	 completely determined by 
the producers' response to price, under 	 conditions 
of pure competition (where the producer bases plans 
for 	 future 	 production on the assumption present 
prices will continue, 	 and that his 	 own production 
plans will not effect the market); 
(2) where the 	 time needed for 	 production requires' 
at least one full 	 period before production can be 
changed, once plans are made; 
(3) where the price is set by the supply available. 
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Ezekiel points out that with respect to-production plans for 
many commodities, 	 once 	 underway, 	 little could be done to 
increase production. However, the quantity actually marketed 
could be reduced at any point during the production process, 
e.g. by pulling out plants, slaughtering livestock, etc. 
Natural conditions affecting production were also pointed out as a 
serious limitation of the cobweb model. For example, unusual 
weather could affect production, 	 changing a "normal" crop into a 
"bumper" crop. 
Furthermore, 	 in relation 	 to price 	 setting, Ezekiel points 
out 	 that if prices are set by an administered method, the model 
will 	 break down. .Finally, the equilibrium assumption implies that 
quantity supplied 	 equates quantity demanded. 	 Thus, there is no 
possibility of 	 holding stocks 	 of the commodity. 	 Clearly, this is 
a limitation for any but the more perishable commodities. 
The cobweb model, then, can be expressed as: 
Qt = a - b(Pt) 
	 (3.2i) 
Qs = c + d(Pt-1) 	 (3.22) 
(3.23) 
where 	 a,b,c,d are parameters and where all other factors are 
in-C-hanged. 
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3.4 Model Three: 	 Adaptive Expectations Model 
The cobweb model, as noted by Ezekiel, is a rather naive 
formulation of which some of the limitations have been pointed out 
above. However, the model serves as a convenient departure point 
for 	 the development 	 of more sophisticated models 	 of more 
specialised industries. 
M. Nerlove (1958) has expanded the scope of the naive cobweb 
model 	 by incorporating an equation expressing the supply of a 
commodity 	 as a function of expected price. 	 In Nerlove's words 
(p.231): 
farmers 	 take 	 past 	 prices 	 into account when 
forming 	 their expectations of future 
"normal" price, 	 . but 	 they do not give all 
the weight to 	 one particular 	 price. When 
current 	 price increases, farmers may be expected 
to discount 	 some of the increase, i.e. they will 
not 	 believe in the permanance of the entire 
•change. 	 Arrow and I have called such induced 
expectations "adaptive." 
The form 	 of the expectations generating mechanism specified by 
-Nerlove was expressed as: 
(Pt - 	= 13(P t-1 - 0<f3<1 
(3.24) 
where -13* 	 is defined as expected 	 "normal" price in 	 period t, and 
where 	 fi is a parameter to be known as the coefficient of 
expectations. 	 Thus, 	 previous expectations of normal price are 
revised 	 in proportion to the difference between actual and what 
was previously considered to be therl,nolKAw 	
• 
Hence, the adaptive expectations model or a commodity. market 
could be expressed as: 
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Qt = a - bPt 	 (3.25) 
Qt = c + d(Pt) 
	 (3.26) 
(3.27) t 
(pt _ 	 = a(pt-1 - 	 0<a<1 
	 (3.28) 
It can be seen that if 	 is equal to unity, the model reduces to 
the naive cobweb model as expressed above. 
A criticism often 	 made of the 	 adaptive expectations 
hypothesis is of the ad hoc way that the expectations generating 
mechanism 	 has been 	 specified. 	 By 	 simple rearranging the 
expectations 	 generating 	 mechanism 	 can 	 be written as the 
first-order difference equation: 
	
P = t + (1-13)Pt-1 
	 (3.29) 
It can be shown that given 	 the appropriate initial 	 conditions a 
general solution to the above equation is: 
m 
Pt* = (1-13)E 	 . 	
(3.30) 
t-i-1 i=0 
Expected price, then, 	 is a geometrically-declining weighted 
average of past prices. 	 It has been pointed out that the ad hoc 
criticism is due to the restrictions placed on the distributed lag 
parameters which are not the result of an optimisation process. 
That is, nothing from the producer's or buyer's profit 
maximisatingutput s-il: blem-deal.s with the formulation of 
expectations, nor imposes the restriction that the weights on the 
previous prices decline in a geometric fashion. 
48 
A variation of Nerlove's adaptive expectations model widely 
used 	 in explaining the variation of agricultural supply is known 
as a supply response model. Askari and Cummings (1977), in a 
recent survey summarise more than 600 published studies using this 
model. The structural equations of the model can be written in 
the most elementary form as: 
A* = ao + alPt + a2zt + ut 	 (3.31) 
(3.32) 
At = At-1 + y(At —  At-1) 	 0<y<1 	 (3.33) 
where: At=actual area under cultivation at time t; 
At*=des'ired area under cultivation at time t; 
pt=actual price at time t; 
• 	 pt*=expected price at time t; 
Zt=other exogenous factors at time t. 
It is noted that the above model 	 is a supply model only, 
which would require the addition of a demand relationship and an 
equilibrium 	 condition 	 to 	 complete 	 the .market 	 model. 	 It 	 is 
interesting to 	 note however, 	 that two adjustment mechanisms are 
embodied 	 in the supply response model. 	 Firstly is the mechanism 
(3.32) 	 whereby 	 price is expressed as a geometrically declining 
weighted average of 	 past actual prices. 	 There is also a partial 
adjustment mechanism (3.33) which states that farmers change their 
actual 	 plantings in proportion to the difference between their 
desired 	 level and their previous actual level of plantings. 	 This 
proportion, 	 Y. 	 is the rate of adjustment from actual to desired 
levels. 	 If 	 y=1, 	 the adjustment 	 from actual to desired levels 
',(5642Ti --period, while- if y<1, the adjustment is Al-6v - 
completed within a period. This mechanism is used in empirical 
studies of agricultural production to capture Certain 
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technological 	 constraints, 	 for example the perennial nature of 
certain crops. 	 It can also account for asset fixity whereby, due 
to 	 the low salvage values of most agricultural projects, actual 
plantings are not adjusted to desired levels. 
G.T. Jones (1961) utilised the Nerlovian model to estimate 
the 	 elasticities of supply response for various agricultural 
products in the United Kingdom. Of particular note was the 
inclusion of an annual blackcurrant model as well as other soft 
fruits models in this study. Jones' model was expressed as: 
xt = a + bPt 	 (3.34) 
Pt = (1-k)Pt-1 + kPt-1 
	 (3.35) 
xt = (1-r)xt_1 + rxt 	 (3.36) 
where: 	 x*t = long-run equilibrium supply; 
p*t = long-run equilibrium price; 
xt = observed supply; 
pt = observed price; 
= rate of price adjustment; 
= rate of technical adjustment. 
If r or k are assumed equal— o unity the above system can be 
reduced to: 
(3.37) xt = d + ePt-1 + fxt-1. 
In this case k (or r depending upon which rate of adjustment was 
set equal to unity) is equal to (i-f). 	 Jones defined x to be area 
under 	 production after finding no evidence in support of a 
relationship between price and yield. To consider 'supply" equal 
to 	 .area under production caught a technical—,=_co l , 
blackcurrant 	 production, 	 being the lag between planting and 
harvesting. 	 Had output been the dependent variable, the gestation 
period would be discounted. 
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Jones pointed out a few problems with estimating the supply 
response elasticities using equation (3.37). 	 In particular, for 
soft fruits 	 it is probable that there will exist autocorrelation 
in 	 the residuals due to the perennial nature of the commodity. 
Furthermore, 	 it was considered impossible to set the value of r 
equal 	 to unity, that is assuming that production adjusts to its 
long-run 	 equilibrium within one year. It was also considered 
improbable that 	 price uncertainty was negligible even with the 
existence of significant numbers of contractual arrangements. 
this case, where it is impossible to set either k or r equal to 
unity the estimating equation becomes: 
xt = d + eP 1  + fxt-1 + gxt-2 t- (3.38) 
In this 	 case, the long-run elasticity of supply response (b in 
equation (3.34)) can be written as: 
(3.39) 
1 -f -g 
 
however, 	 r and k will not be separably identifiable. 	 In the 
Appendix to Jones article it was pointed out that the simple form 
the model (equation (3.37)) could be used in this case as an 
approximation. However in this case the estimates obtained would 
be biased upwards, although if r or k was near unity, the bias 
would be less. 
The 	 short- 	 and 	 long-run 	 elastri sf-7- ..;:s:AWAly were 
estimated 	 by Jones using OLS. 	 In the simple model (3.37) the 
short-run elasticity was calculated 	 to be .29, while the long-run 
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elasticity was calculated to be 1.16. 	 In the case where r or k 
were not constrained to be unity (3.38), the short-run elasticity 
was .18 while in the long-run was .62. 
3.5 Model Four: Rational Expectations Model 
The models presented above have largely explained variations 
in supply as some function of expected price and other variables. 
In the case of the simple cobweb model expected price was 
expressed 	 as the previous period's price. Nerlove generalised 
this result to give the "adaptive" expectations hypothesis whereby 
expected 	 price 	 was expressed 	 as a 	 geometrically weighted 
distributed 	 lag of past actual prices. 	 The essence of these 
expectations models are that they introduce unobservable variables 
into 	 the 	 specification 	 the model. 	 By deriving 	 some 
expectations-generating 	 mechanism, the unobservable variable is 
substituted for by an observable variable. 
Muth (1960)introciuced the concept of a model which embodies 
"rational" 	 expectations. 	 That is, it is assumed that the economic 
agents 	 in a market do not waste information, 	 rather if a 
supply/demand 	 framework is 	 representative of the market, this 
information 	 will be used by the participants in forming their 
expectations. 	 The reduced-form of the relevant model can be used 
in 	 forecasting expected price, 	 which can then be used as the 
relevant 	 expectations 	 variable _ in 	 estimating the model's 
structural parameters. 
The rationaleX.0-eC'ea.Cilinflibthesis can be incorporated 
into a general supply/demand model in the following manner: 
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Qd = a - bPt + eZt + ult 
t = c + dPt + fXt + u2t 
(3.40) 
(3.41) 
(3.42) 
(3.43) t-1Pt = E(Pt I It-1) 
where Zt, Xt are exogenous variables and all other .' variables are 
as 	 described above. 	 The symbol It-I denotes ihe available 
information at the end of time (t-1). Under appropriate 
conditions a rational expectation is an unbiased estimate of the 
actual price given the information available at the time when the 
expectation if formed. Rationality in this sense implies that it 
is impossible to add an equation which appears to be a reasonable 
explanation how expectations might be formed. •The price 
expectation equation 	 must satisfy (3.43) which implies that 	 it 
should be derived from the structure of the model. 
The reduced form equation for price can be expressed as: 
a -c 	 d * e 	 f 	 1 Pt 	 P + 	 Z - --- X + ---(ult-u2t). 	 (3.44) 
Taking expectations, where E(p0=pt*, after rearrangement: 
a-c Pt -     E ( Z t)  E(Xt) b-d 	 b-d 	 b-d 
(3.45) 
given 	 that the disturbance terms of the supply and demand 
functions are equal to their mean values of zero. 
The expected price is expressed as a function of the expectations 
of 	 the 	 exogenous variables 	 Zt and 	 Xt. 	 Expressing these 
expectations 	 as 	 E(Zt)=Zt* and E(Xt)=Xt* and substituting into 	 the 
. 	 , 
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t = a + bPt + eZt + ult 
	 (3.46) 
,s 	  
	
b(a-c) 	 be 	 bf + a + 	  Z; 	 Xt + fXt +u2t  b-d 	 b-d 	 b-d 
d s  Qt = t. 
(3.48) 
In order to estimate the parameters of the model it is 
necessary 	 to specify forecasting functions for the exogenous 
variables 	 Zt* and Xt*. 	 Wallis 	 (1980) has suggested using a 
first-order autoregressive model, that is: 
Xt 	 (Dxt-1 + et. 
Taking expectations: 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
where E(Xt)=Xt*. 	 The structural 	 system, then, 	 consists of 	 the 
equations (3.46) to (3.48) and the forecasting functions: 
(3.51) Z 
1 
xt = (p2xt_i. 	 (3.52) 
Nerlove, et. al. (1979) point out that rational expectations 
from an economic point of view are more consistent with the 
underlying structure of economic behavior than alternative models 
of expectations such as the cobweb or adaptive expectations 
.iffactedid, 	 The rational 	 expectations model . 	 is 	 theoreticajj 
satisfactory 	 but 	 presents 	 problems 	 in 	 empirical 	 usage. 
Technically, 	 the 	 model is difficult to estimate compared with the 
other expectations models. 
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3.6 A Model for the Tasmanian Blackcurrant Industry  
As indicated above, very little empirical 	 work aimed 
specifically at the blackcurrant market has been reported in the 
literature, with the only contribution being the study by Jones 
(1961) 	 and (1962). The foregoing sections of this chapter have 
had 	 the purpose of outlining the predominant approaches to 
modelling a partial equilibrium model of an agricultural market. 
Criticisms of these approaches have been included throughout this 
discussion, which 	 will now form the basis of establishment for a 
model 	 of the Tasmanian blackcurrant industry. A guide to the 
institutional constraints 	 on the market was given above, which 
should also be considered in specifying the estimated model. The 
supply function shall be considered firstly, followed by the 
demand function and equilibrium condition. 
Model One is extremely general in its specification of 
supply. 	 Its major contribution to the explanation of supply 
resides 	 in the 	 inclusion of variables other 	 than own price. 
Traditionally 	 empirical studies have added variables such as 
alternative 	 product 	 prices, 	 input 	 prices, 	 weather 	 and 
technological 	 proxies, 	 etc. 	 with the aim to capture shifts in the 
supply 	 function, 	 caused by such things as changes to relative 
profitability 	 to 	 other production alternatives, changes 	 to cost 
structures, 	 improvements 	 in 	 technology, 	 etc. 	 To 	 include 	 or 
exclude 	 these variables should be justified by the characteristics 
of the particular market. 
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For blackcurrant production the question of the effectof 
relative profitability appears to warrant inclusion. 	 Although due 
to the fixity of assets in perennial production, switching to a 
more profitable alternative may not be feasible in the short-run, 
especially for enterprises using mechanical harvesting technology. 
However, long-run alternatives must affect blackcurrant 
production. 
Changes in cost structure would appear to have an obvious 
effect on production. However, again, due to the perennial nature 
of the product the onlyapparent variable cost which will impact 
upon production is the cost of harvesting labour. That is, after 
blackcurrant plantation is established and becomes mature, 
production 	 of fruit will occur irregardless of 	 the cost of 
maintaining 	 the plantation. 	 Harvesting costs will impact on 
production 	 however, which is why fruit is usually harvested as 
long 	 as the revenue generated is greater than the cost of 
harvesting. 	 Harvesting costs, 	 then, should be included in the 
supply function. 	 These costs involve such items as casual picking 
labour and variable picking machine costs such as petrol. 	 For the 
predominate part of the sample period blackcurrants were harvested 
by 	 hand picking. 	 The appropriate variable to include in the 
supply function 	 would be the wage rate for casual agricultural 
workers. 
Weather has an 	 obvious effect on the 	 production of 
agricultural 	 products and blackcurrants in particular. Rainfall 
is a very important factor in determining the yield. 	 In addition 
to 	 providing 	 rains 	 provide frost 
protection for blackcurrant plants. 	 Again it appears appropriate 
to 	 include a variable representing the weather influence on 
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supply, 	 preferably an index of rainfall. As the production of 
blackcurrants is 	 predominately located in the same geographical 
location, an 'index of rainfall would be a reasonable proxy. 
A variable to explain technological improvements might also 
be 	 thought 	 of as 	 appropriate in 	 a supply 	 function for 
blackcurrants. 	 The adoption of mechanical harvesting would be the 
main 	 source 	 of technological 	 improvement for 	 blackcurrant 
production. 	 As with the weather variable mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, 	 several methods of modelling the effects of 
technology have 	 been used in empirical research. The predominant 
approach 	 has been to include a trend variable, assuming that 
technological 	 improvements occur as a linear progression through 
time. 	 An alternative is Griliches' (1957) method of fitting a 
logistic growth 	 curve which would allow the improvements to be 
introduced over a period of time, in a non-linear fashion. 
The cobweb model presented as Model Two contributes to the 
supply function through the introduction of a naive formulation of 
expected 	 price as a relevant variable. As mentioned above the 
cobweb 	 supply function assumes that producers expect that the 
price they receive in the current period shall continue into the 
future. This naive expectations formulation is important, 
however, as the remainder of the models presented above build on 
this idea of supply as a function of expected price. 
Nerlove's adaptive expectations market model adds a more 
specific formulation of how price expectations are formed. 
Through his—expe.ctsttons generating mechanism, Nerlove's supply 
function contributes the idea that lagged production as well as 
lagged price are important in explaining agricultural production. 
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Again, 	 using lagged supply appears to capture the perennial nature 
of the production of blackcurrants. However, the inclusion of 
lagged supply may only capture the effect of any persistent trends 
in the data. Ladd (1959) has suggested the inclusion of a time 
trend when using this form of Nerlove's model. 
Nerlove's 	 supply 	 response 	 model 	 takes the adaptive 
expectations 	 framework 	 from Model Three and 	 adds a stock 
adjustment mechanism 	 to relate the change of actual to desired 
levels. 	 The dependent variable most often used in empirical 
studies utilising 	 this model is area planted on the assumption 
that 	 producers couch their production decisions in terms of area 
planted 	 rather 	 than output produced. 	 In this sense the stock 
adjustment 	 equation relates how a producer adjusts his planted 
area from 	 actual to desired levels. 	 As mentioned above, for a 
perennial 	 commodity 	 with a long lead time to produce, 	 the 
adjustment to 	 long-run desired levels would certainly be greater 
than one year. 
The 	 rational 	 expectations 	 supply function, 	 like that of 
Model One is completely general in presentation. 	 The contribution 
it makes to 	 the theoretical model of supply for blackcurrants lies 
in its differing approach to the modelling of price expectations, 
as 	 was pointed out above 	 in the discussion of 	 the model. 	 It is 
feasible 	 to 	 derive a comparable model 	 using 	 the rational 
expectations 	 approach 	 to that using the adaptive expectations 
approach. 	 Hence the supply response approach attributed to 
gerlove 	 could 	 be adapted to utilise rational expectations by 
the 	 expectations generating mechanism, solving_:,1.047,17.X ie-= 
:-educed 	 form 	 of the price variable and continuing as outlined 
ibove. 
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The possibility of using essentially the same model but 
utilising differing assumptions about the form of the expectations 
generating mechanism is appealing in that the competing hypotheses 
could be tested. Sheffrin (1984) has provided this rationale for 
the comparison of adaptive vs. rational expectations by suggesting 
that of the over 600 reported studies surveyed in Askari and 
Cummings (1977) perhaps many would be consistent with the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Hence, the supply response model 
outlined by Nerlove for agricultural products will be adopted as 
the preferred 	 modelling approach for the Tasmanian blackcurrant 
industry and 	 will be estimated using both the adaptive and the 
rational expectations mechanisms. 
The supply response model necessitates disaggregating the 
supply function into two equations, an area function and a yield 
function. The area function should, theoretically, capture the 
planning 	 or "desired" component of quantity supplied while the 
yield 	 function 	 should capture the harvesting decisions. 	 The 
appropriate 	 explanatory 	 variables in the area function would 
include 	 expected 	 price, 	 an 	 index of 	 costs, 	 an index 	 of 
alternative products' 	 prices, 	 an 	 index of technology, and 	 lagged 
area, 	 assuming a partial adjustment of actual to desired area. 
The 	 functional 	 form with all variables in logarithmic form is 
given by: 
At = ao + alPt + a PPt + a3PRt + a4Tt + a5At-1 + ult (3.53) 
where: At = area under cultivation at time t; 
pt* = expected real price at time t; 
PPt = index of prices paid by farmers at time t; 
PRt = index of prices received by farmers at time t; 
Tt = time trend at time t; 	 J: 
tilt = stochaistic disturbance at time t. 
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The yield function should include the explanatory variables 
of actual 	 price (as prices are announced prior to harvest), the 
cost 	 of harvesting labour, and an index of rainfall. 	 The 
logarithmic functional form is given by: 
Y = b, + blPt • b2Lt + b3RAIN + U2t 
	 (3.54) 
where: 	 Yt = yield per hectare at time t; 
pt = actual price of blackcurrants at time t; 
Lt = index of farm wages at time t; 
RAINt = index of rainfall at time t; 
U2t = stochaistic disturbance at time t; 
In application of the adaptive expectations hypothesis the 
following equation specifying the formulation of expectations will 
be used: 
Pt = Pt-1 + (1-b)P _1 	 0<b<1. 
	 (3.55a) 
In estimating the supply function in the context of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, it will be assumed that expectations are 
the predictions given by the theory, that is: 
t-1Pt = E(Pt 1 
	 (3.55b) 
To close the supply response component of the model, the 
identity equating quantity supplied to the product of area and 
yield is given again in logarithmic form by: 
QSt = At + Yt 
	 (3.56) 
where QSt = quantity,s-upfrhi:ed,'&:thriilng period 
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Like that of supply,the demand function of Model One is very 
general, 	 but again, allows for non-price influences as demand 
curve 	 shifters. 	 The demand function described for an input 
included 	 such additional influences as the price of the final 
product, 	 prices of other inputs, and the state of technology. 
Other influences 	 which might be considered to be important and 
which have been included in empirical studies for derived demand 
functions are income, and the prices of substitute and 
complementary products. 
For the Tasmanian industry the demand for blackcurrants 
largely is for the production of juice. Therefore it appears that 
the price 	 of blackcurrant juice should be included in the demand 
function. 	 Due to the predominance of Cascade Cordials Pty. Ltd. 
in • 	 the local industry, the price of 	 its product, "Ultra-C" has 
been used as a proxy for output price. 
The input prices which are considered relevant to the 
industry other than the own price of blackcurrants are those of 
sugar and labour. 
Income variations are assumed to affect the demand for 
blackcurrant 	 juice and hence, the demand for blackcurrant fruit. 
As this 	 income variable would normally be included for a consumer 
demand 	 function we are, 	 by including it in the input demand 
function, 	 assuming away the significance of the wholesale and 
retail markets. 	 This practice is usual in research for derived 
demand studies [cf. Goodwin and Sheffrin, 19821. 
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Again the technology factor is included to account for any 
shifts in the input demand curve due to productivity improvements, 
new technology, 	 etc. 	 Like that of the supply function, a linear 
time trend shall be used to proxy for technological improvements. 
The possibility of non-competitive buying by processors of 
blackcurrants has been mentioned above. If this possibility is 
correct input demand functions would not be defined, rather there 
would be one profit maximising input "demand" for any given input 
supply function. Identification of demand behavior in this case 
would 	 be 	 difficult in that the elasticity of supply would be 
required 	 as 	 datum. 	 To avoid this identification problem, we 
recall a purpose of establishing the Soft Fruit Industry Board as 
being to increase 	 the competitiveness of the industry. We also 
point to 	 the evidence that the Board has been using its price 
setting powers 	 effectively as mentioned above. 	 Hence, although 
the 	 possibility 	 of non-competitive behavior cannot be modelled 
directly, 	 the 	 evidence 	 suggests 	 that 	 the 	 possibility is less 
important in the presence of the Soft Fruit Industry Board. For 
the purposes of this thesis it will be assumed that the market for 
blackcurrants is competitive both on the side of supply and of 
demand. 
The cobweb, adaptive expectations, and rational expectations 
models all use essentially the same demand function. For 
expository _reasons, demand is expressed as a function of price and 
other relevant exogenous variables. The predominant reason for 
such a simple model of demand is that in all of the above three 
cases, supply behavior, more particuly,.-rtAes:po:115;e.„,of supply 
to 	 price 	 expectations, 	 has 	 been the 	 focus of attention. 
Furthermore, 	 it has been assumed in the above models that the 
commodity of concern was non-storable. 
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Blackcurrants, however, are storable through freezing. The 
question 	 of 	 modelling inventories is therefore appropriate to 
consider. 	 However, due to the lack of statistical information on 
the quantities of stocks held in frozen form by the processors, it 
was not 	 possible to model inventories. It is therefore assumed 
that 	 the 	 quantity demanded relates to requirements for both 
production and changes in stock levels. 
The 	 demand for Tasmanian blackcurrants then, can be 
expressed mathematically in logarithmic form by the equation: 
41)t = co + c1Pt + c 0 + c3INCt + c4AWEt + c5SUGARt + u3t.  
where QDt = quantity demanded at time t; 
OPt = price of blackcurrant juice at time t; 
INCt = national income per capita at time t; 
AWEt = index of average weekly earnings at time t; 
SUGARt = deflated price of sugar at time t; 
U2t = stochaistic disturbance at time t. 
The equilibrium condition which closes the model, will as in 
the 	 traditional case, 	 state 'that quantit-demande.d- will equate 
quantity 	 supplied. 	 Due to 	 the 	 importation of significant 
quantities 	 of blackcurrants from New Zealand during the sample 
period, 	 quantity supplied will 	 be 	 expressed as 	 the quantity 
supplied 	 from domestic sources plus that imported from New 
Zealand. 	 The equilibrium definition then is: 
(3.58) QDt = QSt + QMt 
where QMt = the quantity of imports from New Zealand at period t. 
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To utilise the rational expectations approach in additon to 
the 	 above equations 	 (3.53) to (3.58) 	 forecast values for the 
exogenous 	 variables must be obtained. Following Wallis (1980) 
-first-order 	 autoregressive forecasting equations shall be used to 
predict the relevant series. The complete model is given by the 
equations (3.53), (3.54), (3.55b), (3.56), (3.57), and (3.58) 
along with the values forecast for the exogenous variables. The 
endogenous variables are 0St, (Mt, At, Yt, pt, and pt*. 
Equation (3.55b) and its associated endogenous variable pt* 
can 	 be eliminated from the model by solving for the reduced form 
equation 	 of the price variable, pt. 	 Taking its expectation 
allows, 	 after manipulation, the derivation of a reduced for 
equation 	 for expected price which may then be substituted into 
equation 	 (3.53). 	 The expected price reduced form equation is 
given by: 
t = 
	
(Y - a - a ){ a + a + y + a PP.._ 	 3 + aPR 1	 t 1 	 1 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 2 	 E. 
* 	 * + a T, + a5At-1 + L, + 03RAINt - y2OPt 4 L. 	 2 t- 
- y INC, - y AWE, - y SUGARt + IMPt 3 	 4 
(3.59) 
Substituting 	 this 	 equation in 	 equation (3.53) yields 	 the 
non-linear area function: 
At = al) + a { (yi-a1-131)-1 (a13-00-Yo+a2PPt+a3PRt+a4Tt * 	 * 	 * 	 * +asAt_i+a2Lt+a3RAINcy2OPt -Y3INCt-y4AWEt-y5SUGARt 
* +IMPt)1 + a2PPt+a3PRt+al.Tt+a5At-1+ult 	 (3.60) 
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The complete model of 5 equations is given by the equations 
(3.60), 	 (3.54), 	 (3.56), (3.57), and 	 (3.58) again along 	 with the 
forecast values of the exogenous variables. 	 The endogenous 
variables are now QDt, QSt, At, Yt, and pt. 
To 	 utilise 	 the 	 adaptive 	 expectations 	 approach the 
unobservable variable pt* must be eliminated. Rearranging (3.53): 
ao 	 1 	 a2 	 as 	 a4 	 as 	 1 Pt 	 _ 	 At + ---PPt + ---PRt + 	 T + ---Ult (3.61) At _1 + al 	 al 	 al 	 al 	 a.i 	 al 	 al 
Lagging (3.61) by one period yields: 
(3.62) 
Pt-1 = 
ao 1 	 a2 	 as 	 a4 At-1 + —. PP 1 -+ t-1 + al
Tt + al 	 al 	 al 
Us 	 1 
At-2 + 	 ult-li al 	 al 	 1 I 
 
Substituting 	 (3.61) 	 and (3.62) 	 into (3.55a), 	 after manipulation 
leads to: 
(3.63) 
t-1 = (1-A)a0-((l-A)-as)At-1+(l-A)a2PP 	 +(1-flasPRt-1 t-1 
+ (1-X)a4Tt+(1-A)a5At_24-APt-l-a2Pipt-a3PRt-a4Tt 
- ult-(1-A)111t-1 
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Again, one equation and one endogenous variable (pt*) has 
been eliminated from the model. The adaptive expectations model, 
then, is expressed by the equations (3.63), (3.54), (3.56), 
(3.57), and 	 (3.58). The endogenous variables are At, Yt, QSt, 
QDt, and pt. 
An alternative to the full information extimation of a model 
using the rational expectations hypothesis has been outlined by 
Sheffrin (1982) based on the work of McCallum (1976), who adopted 
an instrumental variables approach to estimation of the parameters 
of a single equation in a partial equilibrium market model. 
Under 	 the 	 assumption 	 of 	 rational expectations, the 
difference between the expected price and the true price can only 
differ by a random element uncorrelated with the information 
available when the expectation was formed, that is: 
Pt = t-1Pt 	 (t)t 	 (3.64 ) 
Given that 	 Itt is uncorrelated with the information set when the 
expectation was formed, this implies that: 
= 0 
 (3.65 ) 
and hence, 
E(Pt) = 
Substituting 	 (3.64 ) into the supply function allows 
expectation hypothesis to enter giving: 
= c + dP, + + (u2t- 
(3.66) 
the rational 
(3.67) 
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Clearly the error term is correlated with pt in which case 
applying 	 OLS will 	 not yield 	 consistent estimates of the 
parameters. An instrumental variable estimateor will yield 
consistent estimates, however. Choice of appropriate instruments 
will allow the construction of a "first stage" forecast of pt*, 
which may then be substituted for pt in equation (3.67). 
McCallum (1976) utilised various combinations of variables 
In constructing his "instrument." The seven options he outlined 
included: 
1. using all predetermined variables for the entire 
system as instruments; 
2. in addition to all predetermined variables for the 
system adding lagged values of those variables 
which had the greatest explanatory power in option 
(1); 
3. in addition to all predetermined variables for the 
system adding lagged values of the "expectations" 
variable; 
4. using 	 current 	 and 	 lagged 	 values 	 of 	 all 
predetermined variables in the eatinesystem; 
5. using the "expectations" variable as 	 its own 
instrument; 
6. using only those predetermined variables which 
enter the system with lags as instruments; 
7, using only those predetermined variables which 
enter the system with lags, along with lagged 
values of the "expectations" variable. 
Sheffrin 	 points out 	 that advantages 	 of the limited 
information 	 approach include the simplicity of application as 
compared 	 to that 	 of a full-information 	 maximum likelihood 
estimation 	 of 	 an entire 	 model. 	 Furthermore, 	 the limited 
information techrriqu.efilpto'W;,:fis the ,exam na t ion_ of one equation 
without being overly concerned with the specification of the other 
equations in the model. However, a draw back of the approach is 
that as 	 a limited information technique, 	 the resulting estimates 
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would not be as efficient as those obtained via a full information 
maximum likelihood estimator. A further draw back to the use of 
the instrumental variables estimator is that the rational 
expectations hypothesis cannot be explicitely tested. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA 
4.1 Introduction  
Having outlined the modelling approach for this thesis in 
the previous 	 chapter, it 	 is now necessary to consider the data 
requirements 	 of the proposed model. 	 The first section of this 
chapter' 	 shall survey the 	 published data available 	 for 	 the 
blackcurrant 	 industry in Tasmania. The second section of this 
chapter 	 shall 	 assess 	 the data 	 requirements 	 in 	 light 	 of the 
requirements of the proposed model. 
4.2 Available Statistical Information  
The date surveyed in this section shall be included 	 in 
Appendix 2. 
4.2.1 Total Production of Blackcurrants in Tasmania.  
Annual 	 time-series data for this variable are published by 
the Australian 	 Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 'Fruit: Tasmania' for 
the picking season of November to February. The production tonnage 
includes 	 red currants; however, the quantities of this variety are 
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small. 	 Thus, no attempt was make to exclude the production. This 
series 	 is assumed to reflect supply to fresh and processing 
markets. 
4.2.2 Yield per Bearing Hectare.  
Annual time series data for this variable are published by 
the ABS in 'Fruit: Tasmania'. Relevant comments made in (3.2.1) 
above apply to this variable as well. This variable is obtained by 
dividing total production by bearing area. This series is used as 
the dependent variable in the yield function of the supply 
response model. 
4.2.3 Own Price of Blackcurrants.  
Annual time series data for this variable are derived from 
data published by ABS in 'Fruit: Tasmania'. Gross value of 
blackcurrants obtained therein is divided by total production (cf. 
(3.2.1) above) to obtain the required series. This data represents 
the 	 'farm gate' 	 price paid to growers and includes any bounty 
paid. 
4.2.4 Processed Production  
Annual time series data for this variable are obtained from 
the 	 Tasmanian Soft Fruit Industry Board (SFIB) annual reports. 
Quantities refer to blackcurrants only. This series is assumed to 
reflect 	 demand by processors. The fresh market is excluded from 
SFIB jurisdiction. 
70 
4.2.5. Imports of Frozen Blackcurrants.  
Annual time series data for this variable are obtained from 
the 	 SFIB for the picking season November to February. The data 
refer 	 to imports from New Zealand, the principle source of 
residual demand by Tasmanian processors. 
4.2.6. New Zealand Price of Frozen Blackcurrants.  
Annual time series data for this variable are derived from 
SFIB figures, being the value of exports, divided by the 
quantities of exports. The price, is quoted in SNZ per kilogram at 
f.o.b. values. Ideally, the price would need to be in c.i.f. 
terms for comparative purposes. 
4.2.7. New Zealand/Australian Exchange Rate.  
Annual time series data for this variable are derived from 
the bulletin of the New Zealand Reserve Bank. The annual data are 
derived by taking the arithmetic mean of the four quarterly values 
ending March of each particular year. 
4.2.8. Costs of Production.  
The annual series of costs of production used was 'the Index 
of Total Prices Paid by Farmers, Australia' published by the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) in its "Quarterly Review of 
the Rural Economy". The Index measures the change in costs of 
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labour, 	 services, overheads, marketing expenses, equipment, and 
supplies. 	 It is assumed that this series is indicative of factor 
- 
prices faced by producers of blackcurrants in Tasmania. 
4.2.9. Time Trend.  
A time trend was specified as a proxy for technological 
change throughout the sample period. The initial value of the 
trend was set to one and incremented by one, annually. 
4.2.10. Alternative Return To Production.  
The annual series of alternative returns used was the 'Index 
Prices Received by Farmers, Australia' published by the BAE in 
its' 	 Review of the Rural Economy". The index measures 
the change in prices received for various produce. 	 It is assumed 
that this 	 series can be used as a proxy for relative returns in 
alternative markets. 
4.2.11. Index of Inflation.  
Two alternative measures of inflation in annual terms are 
available from the ABS, the popular 'Consumer Price Index' (CPI) 
and the Price Deflator of Gross Domestic Product. Of the two, the 
CPI could 	 be perhaps more relevant, as CPI figures are published 
for Hobart 	 as distinct from a "national" measure implied by the 
GDP Deflator 	 or even the national CPI figure, 	 at least for the 
purpose of supply deflating. 	 For the purpose of demand deflating, 
the G6P--'defrkft-oeornational CPI would be more relevant. 
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4.2.12 Stock Levels  
No quantitative data was available for 	 the level of 
block-frozen blackcurrants held by the major processors from any 
source. Processors were unwilling to reveal quantities of stocks 
either 	 in 	 absolute or 	 relative terms, 	 due to 	 corporate 
requirements of confidentiality. A personal communication with a 
major processor did allow the construction of a qualitative, or 
dummy, 	 variable. In this communication an informed opinion was 
given concerning the state of stock levels for the entire duration 
of 	 the study. 	 Consequently, 	 the 	 qualitative variable was 
constructed whereby 	 a value of zero represented a year in which 
excessively high stocks were held by processors, while a value of 
unity represented 	 normal stock levels. The assignment of zero to 
represent 	 high stocks was chosen as to reflect the depressing 
- 
effect excess stock would have on price and quantity demanded. 
4.2.13 Blackcurrant Juice Price Series  
The data for this series was derived from a survey of 
advertisements in the local Hobart newspaper, the Mercury, over 
the period 1963 to 1983. The sampling procedure used involved a 
visual search of the Wednesday edition of each week in the sample 
period. Wednesday was chosen due to the volume of supermarket 
advertisements in this edition relative to other days in the week. 
Price data was collected on proprietary brand names 
including Cascade's "Ultra-C", Anchor Food's "Blackcurrant Juice", 
Beecham's "Ribena", and other generic or house brands. Data 
recorded 	 also 	 included the date of the advertisement, the 
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advertising 	 supermarket or store, and the unit size of the 
product. 	 •-•14a, 
series was then constructed by taking the The price 
arithmetic 	 mean 
discontinuities 
market 
of 	 each product over each year. 	 Due to 
in the product range and the lack of data on 
shares for each product it was decided that the Cascade 
Ultra-C price series would be used as the proxy for finished goods 
price in estimating the demand function. This assumption doesn't 
seem untenable given the dominance of the market by Cascade in all 
but the last few years. 
4.2.14 Orange Juice Price Series  
- The data for this series was derived in the survey mentioned 
above for the blackcurrant juice price series. Price data was 
collected for proprietary brands such as "Va-lencio", "Orchy", "Mr. 
Juicy", "Berri", 	 and "Huon Vale". Again the data recorded the 
date 	 of the advertisement, the advertising supermarket or store, 
and 	 the unit size of the product. Again discontinuities were 
present 	 with the addition of new brands and deletion of older 
brands. 	 In the case of orange juice an average price per litre 
was constructed by calculating the price per litre based on the 
advertised price. These resulting prices were averaged over all 
products for the year, giving the average annual price used. 
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4.2.15 Average Weekly Earnings  
Data for this series was obtained from various editions of 
the ABS publication "Wages." The series was used in estimating the 
yield function as a proxy for the costs of inputs into the 
production process for blackcurrants. The series was also to be 
used proxy for the costs of the production of blackcurrant 
juice in 	 the demand function. 	 The average week.ly earnings data 
relates to Australia as a whole, rather than only Tasmania. 
4.2.16 Sugar Price  
Data 	 for 	 this series 	 was obtained 	 from a 	 private 
communication 	 with Colonial Sugar Refiners Ltd. 	 (CSR). 	 The 
series, 	 as 	 was the case for average weekly earnings, was to be 
used 	 to represent an alternate input into the production of 
blackcurrant 	 juice. 	 Due to the 	 institutional constraints placed 
on the domestic marketing of sugar in Australia, this sugar price 
reflects 	 the 	 cost of sugar 	 in any capital cltv in 	 Australia. 	 It 
is 	 therefore considered 	 that 	 the 	 series would 	 be valid for 
blackcurrant 	 juice 	 production in Hobart. 	 A differential price for 
other centres would reflect transportation costs. 	 This would not 
seem 	 to 	 be a 	 problem for 	 the present 	 case, as 	 the majority of 
blackcurrant juice is processed in Hobart. 
4.2.17 Area under Cultivation  
Annual 	 time series data for 	 this variable are published by 
tne ABS 	 in "Fruit: Tasmania" for the picking season.*TofAo.v..er0ea 
February. 	 The 	 area 	 includes 	 red 	 currants 	 as well 	 as 
blackcurrants. 	 -Relevant comments made 	 in (3.2.1) above apply 	 to 
this 	 variable 	 as 	 well. 	 This 	 variable 	 has 	 been 	 used as the 
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dependent variable 	 in the area equation of the supply response 
function. 	 This 	 variable 	 is used 	 to reflect producers' desired 
supply, 	 as 	 farmers have control over the area planted, but little 
control 	 over yields, 	 together which determine the quantity of 
output produced. 
4.2.18 Rainfall Index  
This series has been obtained from the A.R.S. publication 
Yearbook: 	 Tasmania, 	 in various editions. 	 The series for rainfall 
is the 	 average annual rainfall recorded 	 in millimeters 	 for the 
Huon 	 Valley area of Tasmania, and is to be used as the weather 
proxy in the yield equation of the supply response model. 
4.2.19 Gross Domestic Product per Capita  
This series 	 has been 	 obtained from 	 the A.R.S. publication 
Yearbook, 	 Australia, 	 in various 	 editions. 	 This series is used as 
the 	 consumer 	 income variable 	 in 	 the 	 demand 	 function 	 for 
blackcurrants. 	 The series "Gross Domestic Product" was divided by 
the "Population Estimates" to obtain the required series. 
4.3 Assessment of Available Statistical Information 
The purpose of this 	 section is to assess the 	 usefulness of 
the 	 data 	 outlined 	 in 	 the 	 previous 	 section 	 of 	 this chapter. 
Modifications 	 requi red 	 will a ls or 	 ,This as  
will 	 be based upon the model developed in Chapter Three, and shall 
be presented in an equation by equation tashion. 
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4.3.1 Area Function  
The area function [cf. 	 equation (3.53), supra.) has 	 as its 
dependent 	 variable area 	 under cultivation. 	 As mentioned in 
the preceding section, the variable which the blackcurrant 
producer has the most control over in a decision-making sense is 
his level of plantings. Area under cultivation, then, must 
include area which is currently being harvested and area which has 
been planted,. but which is not yet to the "bearing" stage. 	 The 
dependent 	 variable used in the area equation has been constructed 
as the sum of bearing and non-bearing area from A.B.S. statistics. 
The price expectations variable for use in the area function 
depends 	 upon the hypothesis employed for that particular model. 
For 	 the adaptive expectations model, 	 price 	 is given as a 
geometrically-declining weighted 	 average of 	 past prices. 	 For the 
rational 	 expectations 	 model, expected price is the price which is 
expected 	 given 	 the 	 structure of 	 the supply/demand model. 	 The 
modelling 	 technique 	 takes care 	 of the 	 proper form 	 of the price 
variable; 	 however, 	 irregardless 	 of 	 which 	 hypothesis is used., 
the 	 price 	 referred 	 to 	 in 	 theory 	 is real price. 	 Hence, it is 
appropriate 	 to 	 deflate 	 price. 	 The 	 Hobart 	 C.P.I. was used to 
deflate price 	 for the supply model. 
The proxy variable for costs of production is given by the 
B.A.E. 	 index of 	 prices paid by farmers. 	 This index is derived as 
a 	 weighted average of prices 	 paid by farmers in a particular 
sample 	 of 	 productio,r i c Itude:labour,. services, overheads, 
marketing 	 expenses, 	 equipment, 	 and 	 supplies. 	 Production costs 
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would have 	 to be weighted similarly in the blackcurrant industry 
for 	 this 	 index 	 to be 	 strictly comparable. 	 However, , as 	 no 
alternative series of cost data is available for the 	 blackcurrant 
industry, 	 it 	 is 	 assumed 	 that 	 the 	 B.A.E. 	 series will 	 be a 
reasonable 	 proxy. The index, again, 	 is in nominal terms and so 
should be deflated as for the price variable. 
The proxy variable for alternative products prices is given, 
by 	 the B.A.E. 	 index of prices recieved by farmers. Again, the 
index is a weighted average of various prices, of which all must 
be viable alternatives to blackcurrant production for the index to 
be strictly valid as measuring alternatives. A different approach 
to using this index would be to include specific product prices as 
alternatives. For blackcurrants, alternatives such as raspberries 
or 	 loganberries might be appropriate. 	 However, as production of 
blackcurrants 	 has moved towards large-scale plantations using 
less-hilly 	 terrain, the 	 alternatives to 	 blackcurrant production 
must 	 have grown. Therefore, 	 the B.A.E. index was used as a proxy 
for 	 alternative returns. 	 As for 	 the index of prices paid, the 
index of 	 prices received 	 is in nominal terms 	 and so should be 
deflated before use in the regression analyses. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, a time trend has been 
added to proxy for technological change. The addition of a 	 linear 
trend 	 will 	 de-trend 	 the other 	 independent 	 variables 	 in a 
regression. 	 In 	 this 	 sense, 	 the 	 inclusion of a this variable 
picks 	 up any persistent 	 trend in the data which is 	 assumed to be 
caused by technological advances. 
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4.3.2 Yield Function  
The yield function has been specified to capture the 
short-run impact 	 of price and other variables on the supply of 
blackcurrants, 	 that 	 is the actual harvest in a particular season. 
The independent variable is production per bearing hectare. 
Non-bearing area is excluded, as production is not yet obtainable 
from this area. 
Again, as for the area function, 	 real price is the variable 
of concern. 	 Thus, nominal price is again deflated by the Hobart 
	
No expectations framework 	 is required, 	 as the price 
affecting 	 the harvest of blackcurrants is announced by the Soft 
Fruit Industry Board prior to the beginning of harvesting. 
The weather proxy variable is an attempt to account for the 
influence 	 of weather on the dependent variable. As mentioned 
above, 	 rainfall 	 is the major aspect of climatic 	 conditions which 
affect's 	 the production of 	 blackcurrants. 	 Several approaches for 
the 	 treatment 	 of weather effects on agricultural production have 
been 	 surveyed by Mules (i972), 	 of which 	 the above is included. 
Mules 	 commented that the above approach can yield fruiful results 
but 	 rejected it when production was spread over a wide area with 
diverse 	 weather 	 conditions. 	 However, 	 because the 	 production of 
blackcurrants 	 is confined 	 for the most part 	 to a 	 few areas in 
southern Tasmania, it is felt that using average rainfall data for 
the Huon Valley would be an appropriate proxy for rainfall as it 
affects the production of blackcurrants. 
- The 	 labour variable 	 is inc]ucieci 	 in the 	 el cl 7func,t;1...o.nnt-R., ;4. 
capture 	 the 	 effect 	 of 	 harvesting 	 costs 	 in 	 the production of 
blackcurrants. 	 According 	 to 	 the 	 Tasmanian Department 	 of 
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Agriculture, 	 the single- most costly co mponent of harvesting is 
labour 	 associated costs, 	 especially for 	 those plantations not 
using mechanical 	 harvestors. 	 Ideally, a ti me series of cas ual 
picking 	 rates would be required. 	 Ho wever, as this data is not 
available, 	 a Proxy  agai n had to he c hose n. 	 In this case the 
A.B.S. 	 published series "Average Weekly Earnings per E mployed Male 
Unit- Hobart" was chosen to represent labour rates. 	 It is assu med 
that relative 	 move ments in this series reflect move ments in the 
casual far m labour rates. 
4.3.3 De mand Function  
The de mand function [cf. equation (3.57),supra.] 	 has as its 
dependent variable annual quantity of blackcurrants produced. 	 The 
series was 	 constructed as a co mposite. of data fro m the Soft Fruit 
Industry 	 Board (Processed Production) after 	 1972, and fro m the 
A.B.S. 	 (Total 	 Production of 	 Blackcurrants in 	 Tas mania) prior to 
1972. 	 Thus, 	 the 	 function 	 shall 	 be measuring 	 the de mand for 
do mestic 	 blackcurrants to be 	 used in the 	 production of consu mer 
goods. 	 As has been mentioned else where in this thesis, the de mand 
is 	 a 	 derived 	 one. 	 Further more, 	 usi ng t his series to reflect 
demand 	 by the 	 processors does not allo w 	 for the 	 separation of 
demand 	 into 	 co mponents for 	 production and inventories. Thus 	 the, 
demand 	 function modelled shall be de mand for both production and 
inventory require ments. 
The o wn price of blackcurrants in the de mand function again 
is • real 	 price per ,tonne. 	 An expectations for mulation has not been 
assu med 	 for 	 de mand, 	 as.::tchel,thyipot o,4,Aprice expectations 	 are 
only 	 being 	 modelled 	 on 	 the 	 supply 	 side. 	 Although 	 it see ms 
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reasonable 	 that processors would form expectations about prices 
and 	 take these expectations Into account in formulating their 
demands for a particular season, it is doubtful that these 
expectations are formed in the same fashion as the expectations of 
the producers, which is implied by the rational expectations 
hypothesis. 
The price of blackcurrant juice has been added to the demand 
equation 	 to capture the effects of the consumer product market. 
Again, 	 juice is the major product use for blackcurrants. 	 The 
price variable for blackcurrant juice has been constructed from a 
survey of 	 newspaper advertisements. 	 As Cascade Cordials is the 
predominant processor, 	 its product's price has been used as the 
proxy for output price. 	 The variable has been expressed in real 
terms 	 by dflating it using the Hobart C.P.I. 	 Ideally, information 
would 	 be available giving 	 the prices for various blackcurrant 
products, 	 market shares, and profit margins which would allow the 
C onstruction of a weighted average price series for 	 blackcurrant 
consumer products, 	 or the separate treatment of demand 	 for each 
product 	 group. 	 Much of 	 this 	 information is unpublished or 
unobtainable 	 from any source. 	 Hence, 	 the adoption 	 of 	 the 
newspaper series is the best, and perhaps only, alternative. 
The price 	 series for alternative inputs into the production 
of 	 ,blackcurrant 	 products 	 include 	 sugar 	 and labour. The sugar 
price 	 series has been obtained from C.S.R. 	 Ltd. as the price of 
sugar 	 in any Australian capital city. 	 This series would, ideally, 
be 	 weighted by the proportion sugar 	 is used in blackcurrant 
is not known with certainty it is 
assumed that 	 the proportion has remained constant over the sample 
period. 	 Thus the 	 sugar 	 price 	 in 	 real 	 terms has entered' the 
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analysis 	 with weights. 	 Similarly, 	 the 	 real 	 price of labour 
(Average 	 Weekly Earnings per Employed Male Unit-Hobart) 	 has 
entered 	 the 	 analysis without 	 weight assuming 	 that labour 
productivity has remained constant throughout the sample period. 
The time series for real gross domestic product per capita 
again reflects 	 the market conditions for blackcurrant products, 
that 	 is the effect of consumers' 	 income on the demand for 
blackcurrant products. This series is the widest possible 
interpretation of national "income" including wages and salaries, 
gross operating surplus, indirect taxes, and subsidies. 
; 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction  
In this 	 chapter, we will discuss 	 the results of estimating 
the 	 parameters of the model for the Tasmanian blackcurrant 
industry 	 based upon the data described in the previous chapter. 
Before presenting 	 the regression results some preliminaries will 
be discussed in this introductory section. These relate to 
problems encountered in estimating the demand function, estimation 
methods used, the statistical problems encountered, the test 
statistics used, and alternative hypothesis employed. 
As mentioned above, 	 the traditional model of demand assumes 
that quantity demanded is a function of price and other variables. 
This 	 was the working hypothesis 	 for the Tasmanian blackcurrant 
industry 	 from 	 the 	 beginning 	 of 	 this 	 study. 	 However, 	 after 
successive 	 attempts 	 to model the demand function tailed to achieve 
significant 	 estimates 	 of 	 the 	 coefficient 	 of 	 own 	 price, 	 an 
alternative 	 hypothesis was proposed, that 	 being that the demand 
for Tasmanian blackcurrants was infinitely elastic. 	 In this case, 
the 	 simultaneous nature 	 of 	 exi,l_japses into a 
recursive model whereby price determines quantity supplied. 
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The hypothesis of an infinitely elastic demand can be 
justified 	 by three observations. 	 Firstly, 	 we recall that under 
the SFIB 	 regime Cascade established long-term contracts for the 
purchase 	 of blackcurrants. 	 Among the terms and conditions of 
these contracts 	 was stipulated that Cascade would purchase all 
quantities produced under contract, at the ruling SFIB price. 
Secondly, 	 the size of the Tasmanian industry is relatively 
small compared with that of the major producing countries of the 
world. 	 Although complete statistics on a world-wide basis are not 
published, 	 the relative size of the Tasmanian industry can be seen 
by comparison of data in Tables 6, 7, and 8 above. 
Finally, 	 empirical observation 	 suggests an infinitely 
elastic demand for Tasmanian blackcurrants. A scatter diagram of 
real price and quantity pairs is suggestive of no relationship 
between price and quantity, as shown in Figure 2. 
Given the assumption of an infinitely 	 elastic demand 
function, 	 the market model can be represented by the supply 
function alone. However, in this study, the supply component of 
the blackcurrant model is disaggregated into an area function, a 
yield function, and an identity defining supply as the product of 
area and yield, that is equations (3.53), (3.54), and (3.56). 
Turn now to a consideration of some statistical questions. 
To 	 begin with, 	 all equations were estimated by single equation 
methods, 	 either-i„7.,pi.--Atinary--1„Aas.t 	 sq_uar_ea. (OLS) 	 or instrumental 
variables 	 (IV) 	 techniques. 	 Since estimation is of the components 
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of 	 a market 'model which is assumed to be recursive, the OLS 
estimates will be unbiased and consistent. In this study the 
relative simplicity of using single equation techniques which are 
unbiased and consistent counters any other advantages associated 
with more complex methods, such as three stage least squares or 
full information maximum likelihood techniques. 
Secondly, 	 the test statistics used should be identified at 
this point. 	 The statistics presented with each equation in this 
— 
chapter are R2. the t-ratio for each estimated coefficient, and 
the Durbin-Watson 	 statistic. For equations estimated with lagged 
dependent 	 variables on the right-hand-side, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is inappropriate to test for the presence of first-order 
serial 	 correlation in the residuals. 	 In this case Durbin's h 
statistic is presented. 	 In selecting a preferred equation, 	 four 
criteria have been used: 
a 	 a 	 good 	 tracking 	 performance 	 as given by the 
adjusted coefficient 	 of 	 multiple 	 determination (R2) 
close to its upper limit of unity; 
b. individual 	 parameter 	 estimates 	 which 	 are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, as given by 
the standard t-test; 
c. a 	 lack of serial correlation of the disturbance term at 
the 5 percent 	 level, as 	 given by the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (or the Durbin h statistic, if appropriate); 
d. individual 	 parameter 	 estimates which are consistent 
with theory and other relevant prior information. 
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Furthermore, it should 	 be 	 noted 	 that the problem of 
multicollinearity was encountered in many equations, as is often 
the 	 case in empirical examinations based on time series data, 
especially 	 where current and lagged values of the same variable 
appear in the same equation. 	 Multicollinearity is a data problem 
of which there are no clear-cut solutions. Alternatives do exist 
for treating multicollinearity, including expanding or improving 
the data set, removing one of the offending variables, or changing 
the functional form of the equation. Where the parameter 
estimates 	 are to be 	 used in a 	 structural analysis, 	 the 
multicollinearity 	 problem is quite serious as multicollinearity 
makes OLS estimates rather imprecise. 	 On the other hand, if the 
estimated 	 model 	 were 	 to 	 be 	 used for forecasting, the 
multicollinearity problem would not be as serious, as predictions 
would 	 be based on the multicollinearity continuing into the 
future. 	 In 	 this 	 study 	 multicollinearity was treated by 
experimentation with 	 alternative variables where possible. Where 
no 	 improvement was found, 	 one of the offending variables was 
deleted from the equation. 
Finally, as pointed out above [cf. p.58, supra.] it has been 
perceived as desirable to model the Tasmanian blackcurrant 
industry using two alternative hypotheses about the formulation of, 
price expectations, 	 that is, the adaptive expectations hypothesis 
of Nerlove 	 (1958) and the rational expectations hypothesis of Muth 
(1961). 	 Due 	 to 	 the problems 	 encountered in estimation of the 
demand function as mentioned above, it was assumed that the model" 
for 	 the 	 blackcurrant 	 industry 	 was recursive rather than 
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simultaneous. 	 In this case it was decided to estimate the model 
using single equation methods rather than the systems methods with 
which the rational expectations hypothesis have traditionally been 
estimated with. 	 Again, as mentioned in Chapter Three, McCallum 
(1976) has outlined an approach to the estimation of the 
parameters of a single equation in a rational expectations context 
using an instrumental variables ,(IV) estimator. A similar 
approach was 	 used in estimating the parameters for the Tasmanian 
blackcurrant model -under the hypothesis of rational expectations. 
5.2 Prior Expectations  
In this section the a priori expectations of the various 
coefficients will be discussed, equation by equation. 
5.2.1. Area  
Supply 	 theory 	 suggests 	 that 	 a direct relationship exists 
between 	 price 	 received and quantity 	 supplied. 	 The coefficient of 
the price expectations variable, RP, is expected to be positive. 
An 	 inverse relationship 	 is 	 suggested between supply and 
costs 	 of production. 	 The 	 coefficient of the 	 proxy variable for 
the 	 costs 	 of 	 inputs 	 into 	 the 	 production 	 of blackcurrants 
(PP), is expected to be negative. 
The coefficient of 	 the alternative product prices proxy 
variable 	 -(PR) 	 is 	 ambiguous 	 as 	 alternatives 	 could be 	 either 
complements 	 or 	 subst,ift. forblaurrants. 	 In the case of 
substitutes, 	 there 	 would be an inverse relationship 	 implying that 
as 	 the 	 price of 	 alternative 	 products rose, the producer would 
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reduce 	 production of blackcurrants. 	 In the case of complements, a 
direct relationship would be expected. However, as the B.A.E. 
index of Prices Received by Farmers is used as this proxy variable 
i t  i s expected that the composition of the index will be 
predominantly 	 substitutes. 	 Hence it 	 is expected that 	 this 
coefficient shall be negative. 
The coefficient of 	 the time trend (T) is expected to be 
positive. 	 This 	 expectation 	 is 	 based 	 on the idea that 
technological improvements will occur in a linear fashion over the 
sample 	 period. 	 However, 	 this variable may catch any persistent 
trend 	 in area which 	 could not be explained by any other 
independent variable. 
The 	 coefficient of 	 the 	 lagged 	 dependent variable 
(AREA(-1)) 	 is 	 also expected to be 	 positive. 	 For 	 perennial 
products 	 production levels 	 in any 	 given 	 year are usually 
associated with their levels in the previous year. 
5.2.2. Yield  
Again the 	 price received 	 for a 	 product is 	 expected to be 
directly 	 related 	 to the quantity supplied. 	 The dependent variable 
in 	 the 	 equation is 	 quantity supplied 	 per hectare 	 and therefore 
reflects 	 the harvesting decisions of 	 the producer. High prices 
should, 	 cet. 	 par., lead to high yields. 	 The 	 coefficient of price 
is expected to be positive. 
	
• -.-:'"Ilie'"-C-O-e- f l'i "c'i e n t 	 of , the 	 harvesting labour proxy variable, 
like 	 that 	 of 	 the costs 	 of 	 production 	 variable 	 in the area 
equation, 	 is 	 expected to be 	 negative. 	 High picking costs would 
tend to depress the harvested yield. 
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The coefficient 	 of 	 the 	 rainfall 	 proxy is expected to be 
P0 sitive. 	 As 	 pointed 	 Out 	 above, 	 rainfall 	 provides 	 frost 
protection as well as providing essential nutrients and moisture. 
5.3 Estimated Area Functions  
In this section estimates of 	 the area function shall be 
presented and 'discussed for both the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis and the rational expectations hypothesis. A comparison 
of the results will be presented in the conclusion to this 
chapter. 
5.3.1 Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis  
In applying the adaptive expectations hypothesis to the 
supply 	 response model, various formulations of expectations were 
experimented 	 with. 	 To 	 begin with, 	 the 	 standard adaptive 
expectations 	 mechanism 	 (equation (3.55a)) was used. ,However, this 
lead 	 to a 	 rather 	 poor 	 result 	 with the signs of the estimated 
parameters 	 different 	 trom prior expectations 	 and with relatively 
large 	 standard errors 	 compared to the estimates. 	 Table 	 9 
illustrates 	 the 	 estimates of 	 the parameters 	 using the 	 standard 
adaptive expectations mechanism. 
Two 	 modifications 	 to 	 the 	 standard 	 adaptive expectations 
mechanism were 	 then experimented with. 	 Firstly, 	 it was assumed 
that 	 the geometrically declining distributed lag should not begin 
with the current period, but 	 should begin at some discrete 	 point 
in 	 the 	 past, 	 suggesting 	 a 	 gestation 	 period. 
blackcurrants, 	 it 	 was assumed that due to the four year gestation 
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lag, 	 it would be appropriate to begin the geometric lag in period 
(t-4). 	 The 	 form of 	 the 	 price expectations variable, then, is 
given by: 
co 
Pt = (1-b) E biPt-4-i 	 0<b<1. — i=1 
Table 10 illustrates the estimates of the parameters using 
the parameters using the "delayed formulation of the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis. 	 Again, as was the case with the standard 
form, 	 the criteria for selection of a preferred equation is not 
well 	 satisfied using this form. 	 Few, if any, of the the parameter 
estimates 	 are significantly different 	 from zero based on the 
t-test, 	 R2 values are 	 relatively low, 	 and Durbin's h statistic 
indicates 	 the presence of first-order serial correlation in the 
residuals. 	 It can 	 be assumed, then, that this autocorrelation is 
due to use of an incorrect functional form. 
The 	 second 	 modification 	 to 	 the 	 standard 	 adaptive 
expectations 	 hypothesis 	 derives from the notion of a finite length 
on 	 the 	 distributed 	 lag. 	 The 	 geometrically 	 declining 	 lag is 
truncated at 	 some discrete point in time, implying that after this 
poin • 	 the 	 producer disregards completely 	 any further past prices 
in 	 formulating his current 	 expectation of price. 	 The form of the 
price expectation variable, then, is given by: 
Pt = (1-b) E b
1  P 
i=0 
0<b<1. 
Table 11 illustrates the estimates of the parameters using 
the truncated lag functional form of the 	 adaptive expectations 
hypothesis. 	 Compared to the earlier results presented using other 
forms 	 of 	 the 	 adaptive expe,c.tat,i"OnshT,nphis, the 	 truncated lag 
form 	 is 	 by 	 far 	 the 	 preferred 	 form. 	 Reasonable 	 tracking 
performance 	 is 	 evident 	 by R2 	 values 	 greater 	 than .7-0. 	 The 
signs 	 of 	 the 	 estimated 	 parameters 	 are 	 in most cases consistent 
TABLE 
STANDARD ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
AREA FUNCTION 
EQN CONSTANT RP (-1) 	 . PP (-1) PR (-1) AREA (-1) AREA (-2) R2 DW(h) 
316.784 .1318 -1.051 .0125 .3883 .1641 7.5161 .4780 0.0660 (1.572) (1.8781) (1.7849) (.0488) (1.3046) (.4993) (2.3330) 
5.2 81.8045 .0677 .0339 -.0002 .8033 -.3074 .2847 -1.3132 (.4003) (.8957) (.8082) (.0007) (2.8756) (1.0133) 
5.3 322.4070 .1326 -1.0653 .3915 .1699 7.5128 .5213 -0.0952 (2.0346) (2.0206 (2.1711) (1.0476) (.5804 (2.4359) 
5.4 81.7023 .0677 .0342 .8033 -.3075 .3397 -1.8176 (.5616) (.9614) (.1512) (3.0965) (1.2033) 
5.5 15.0219 .0930 .2371 .5461 -.2129 2.9745 .3829 -0.4716 
(.1259) (1.2819) (.9811) (1.7673) (.7779) (1.3844) 
5.6 95.5101 .0677 -.0201 .8113 -.2995 .3394 -2.3059 (.8860) (.9321) (.1260) (3.2334) (1.0861) 
NOTES: 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Durbin's h statistic is given by DW(h). 
Sample period is 1967-1984 in annual terms. 
TABLE 10 
EQN 
DELAYED ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
AREA FUNCTION 
CONSTANT 	 RP 	 PP 	 PR 	 AREA (-4) 	 (-4). 	 (-4) 	 (-1) AREA (-2) R2 DW(h) 
5.7 226.3622 	 .0353 	 .3334 -.3191 .5298 -.3572 -2.5640 .3390 0.0660 (0.788) 	 (0.2632) 	 (0.679) (1.1214) (1.5054 (1.4523) (1.0761) 
5.8 330.4216 	 -.0112 	 -.0194 -.2593 .5434 -.3341 .3303 -1.3132 (1.2136) 	 (.0877) 	 (.0527) (.9230) (1.5349) (1.3546) q) 5.9 22.9119 	 .0612 	 0-5602 .7765 -.4640 -2.0422 .3248 -0.0952 t\' (0.1246) 	 (.4506) 	 (1.2388) (2.7970) (2.0238) (0.8647) 
5.10 101.9444 	 .0178 	 .2328 .7495 -.4282 .3379 -1.8176 (.9044) 	 (.1450) 	 (.9504) (2.7437) (1.9178) 
5.11 386.7628 	 .0057 -.3987 .4824 -.3241 1.4838 .3687 -0.4716 (2.4217) 	 (.0458) (1.5732) (1.5732) (1.3755) (0.8560) 
5.12 318.1938 	 -.0102 -.2483 .5489 -.3366 .3817 -2.3059 (2.3270) 	 (.0838) (1.3737) (1.6910) (1.4463) 
NOTES: 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Durbin' h statistic is given by DW(h). 
Sample period is 1967-1984 in annual terms. 
)1) 
TABLE 11 
TRUNCATED ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
AREA FUNCTION 
EQN CONSTANT 
RP 
(-1) 
PP 
(-1) 
PR 
(-1) 
AREA 
(-1) R2 DW(h) 
5.13 -88.1912 .3639 -0.3285 .1709 .6349 3.0731 .7175 -0.1999 
(.3822) (2.6533) (0.5709) .7044) (3.9843) (1.1429) 
5.14 -247.446 .3874 .2188 .1860 .5413 .7121 0.7264 
(1.3327) (2.8301) (.6797) (.7606) (3.9227) 
5.15 16.1892 .3684 -0.5354 .6944 3.1764 .7264 -0.2997 
(0.0930) (2.7332) (1.0997) (5.2225) (1.2022) 
5.16 -139.3350 .3932 .0130 .6028 .7193 -0.4954 
(1.1812) (2.9139) (.0757) (5.4609) 
5.17 206.630 .3765 .2416) .5761 1.7952 .7294 0.2072 
.1 (2.0887) (2.8424) (1.1833) (4.8417) (1.2308) 
5.18 -134.232 .3812 .0463 .5844 .7212 0.6345 
(1.6626) (2.8362 (.3550) (4.8470) 
NOTES: 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Durbin's h statistic is given by DW(h). 
Sample period is 1967-1984 in annual terms. 
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with 	 prior 	 expectations. 	 In general, 	 the 	 t-statistics support 
the hypothesis that 	 the parameters are different from zero at the 
5 percent level of significance. Durbin's h statistic also 
indicates the lack of serial correlation at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
There appears to be a problem of multicollinearity between 
the alternate product prices index (PRt) and the cost index (PPt). 
By excluding one of these two variables and reestimating the 
equation, 	 .-E2 	 values 	 are 	 not 	 greatly 	 affected, 	 while 	 the 
t-statistic 	 is 	 increased 	 significantly. 	 This - 	 test 	 of 
multicollinearity should 	 lead 	 one to exclude one of the offending 
variables from the regression. However, as multicollinearity is a 
sample data problem only and is normally encountered in empirical 
research when time series data is used, it is felt that the theory 
should prevail. Theory in this case posits that both the cost 
variable 	 and 	 the alternative products 	 price variable 	 should be 
included 	 in 	 the 	 preferred equation. 	 The preferred equation, then, 
for 	 the adaptive 	 expectations hypothesis 	 area function is given 
Dy: 
(5.13) AREA 	-88.1912 	 .3639(RPt) 	 .3285(PPt) 	 + 	 .1709(PRt) 
(0.3822) 	 (2.6533) 	 (.5709) 	 (.7044) 
0.6349(AREAt-1) 	 3.0731(Tt) 
(3.9843) 	 (1.1429) 
1i2= 0.7175 
h = -.1999 
n = 21 
Based 	 on the above preferred equation, the price elasticity 
of 	 area can be derived. Similarly 	 to the derivation shown above 
p.51, supra.] the long-run elasticity can be calculated as: 
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1 - f 
where e is the estimated short-run price elasticity and f is the 
estimated 	 coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The 
short-run elasticity 	 when evaluated at sample means is 0.7547, 
while 	 the 	 long-run 	 elasticity 	 is 2.0671. 	 The estimated 
elasticities are consistent with prior expectations in that it is 
usually 	 assumed that agricultural production 	 will be price 
inelastic in the short-run but elastic in the long-run. These 
estimates are significantly different from those obtained by Jones 
(1961,1962) in his study of the blackcurrant industry in the 
United Kingdom, where the short-run price elasticity of area was 
found to be .29, while the long-run elasticity was 1.16. 
Estimating the area function with equation (3.53) implies 
that 	 either the coefficient of adjustment (Jones' "r") or the 
coefficient of 	 expectations (Jones' "k") 	 is equal to unity. 	 As 
was pointed out by Jones 	 icf. p.50, 	 supra.] 	 it was thought 
improbabl-e" tha'Ceither of these coefficients could be set equal to 
unity 	 a priori, 	 for the United Kingdom blackcurrant industry. 
However, 	 Jones did estimate this equation for his study with the 
knowledge 	 that doing 	 so wodld upwardly bias the estimated 
parameters. 	 But as Jones noted if either r or k were close to 
unity, the bias would be reduced. 
5.3.2 Rational Expectations Hypothesis  
Single equation estimation of the area function expressed as 
equation 	 (3.53) using the rational expectations hypothesis has 
been performed 	 following the technique outlined above [cf. p.67, 
of 	 the 
instruments. 
significantly. 
in 	 he,.. 	 em 	 as 
Once 	 again, 	 parameter 	 estimates 	 did not 	 alter. 
predetermined 	 variables 
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supra.]. 	 The various 	 options experimented with in constructing 
instrumental 	 variable 	 estimators 	 shall 	 now be discussed. The 
estimations 	 were obtained using a instrumental variables option 
with correction 	 for first-order autocorrelation. 	 Table 	 12 	 lists 
the 	 combination of variables used as instruments in each of these 
regressions. 	 The results of these estimations are shown in Table 
i 3 . 
To begin with the area function was estimated using all 
predetermined variables in the supply model as 	 instruments. The 
resulting estimates 	 are reasonable, based upon the usual criteria. 
The 	 estimates are, 	 in general, 	 of the correct sign and have 
t-statistics 	 which indicate significance from zero. 	 The adjusted 
coefficient of multiple determination is reasonably close to one. 
The second option in constructing the instrumental variables 
estimator 	 adds 	 the lagged variable which has 	 the greatest 
explanatory 	 power 	 the first option to 	 the list of instruments. 
In 	 the present case lagged area was the most significant variable 
in 	 the 	 first option, so was lagged one period further and added to 
the 	 list 	 of instruments. 	 Little 	 change was noted in this 	 option 
compared to the first. 
The third option added the lagged "expectations" variable to 
the instruments, that is, lagged real price. Once again, little 
change was noted compared to earlier options. 
The fourth option included lagged and unlagged values of all 
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The fifth option was using the expectations variable alone 
as its 	 own instrument. 	 This option is identical to estimating 
equation 	 (3.53) 	 using OLS. 	 In 	 this option, 	 the estimated 
parameter values did not change significantly. 
In 	 choosing 'a 	 preferred 	 equation for the rational 
expectations hypothesis 	 it has been noted by Fair (1970) that to 
produce 	 consistent 	 estimates 	 using 	 instrumental variables 
techniques 	 with autoregressive disturbances, it is necessary to 
include lagged 	 dependent and independent variables to the list of 
instruments. 	 In this case, 	 it apprears reasonable to choose 
option 	 4 as the preferred method in estimating the rational 
expectations area function. 	 The preferred equation, then is 
TABLE 12 
INSTRUMENTS FOR RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AREA FUNCTION ESTIMATION 
•REGRESSION NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I C C C. C C N RP RP RP RP RP S PP PP PP PP PP T PR PR PR PR PR R AREA(-1) AREA(-1) AREA(-1) AREA(-1) AREA(-1) U Yield YIELD YIELD YIELD T M AWE AWE AWE AWE E T T T •T N, 
T 
W W 
AREA(-2) 
W 
RP(-1) RP(-1) S PP(-1) 
PR(-1) 
AREA(-2) 
AWE(-1) 
T(-1) 
W(-1) 
TABLE 13 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
EQN CONSTANT RP 
AREA FUNCTIONS 
2 	 PP 	 PR AREA -  1) R2 DW 
5.19 108.8497 .1523 -.8823 .0546 .9677 7.3446 .7221 2.3479 
(.8131) (3.7765) (2.4057) (.3073) (6.5380) (4.2609) 
5.20 109.1007 .1508 -.8799 .0615 .9612 7.3475 .7220 2.3475 
(.8143) (3.7544) (2.3974) (.3479) (6.5333) (4.2589) 
5.21 104.1813 .1558 -.8761 .0479 .9735 7.3170 .7219 2.3667 
(.7803) (3.9249) (2.3905) (.2702) (6.5960) (4.2480) 
5.22 128.8550 .1549 -.9489 .0402 .9790 7.6403 .7229 2.3646 
(.9882) (3.9657) (2.6528) ( 	.2393) (6.8566) (4.5531) 
5.23 109.9551 .1561 -.8967 .0434 .9804 7.3930 .7224 2.3617 
(.8254) (3.8103) (2.4328) ( 	.2440) (6.4930) (4.2525) 
NOTES: 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Sample period is 1964-1984 in annual terms. 
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given by: 
(5.22) 	 AREAt = 128.8550 + 0.1549(RPt) - 0.9489,(PPt) 
(0.9882) 	 (3.9757) 	 (2.6528) 
el■••• R2. .7229 
DW = 2.3646 
n = 20 
+.0.0402(PRt) + 0.9790(AREAt) 
.(0.2393) 	 (6.8566) 
7.6403(T) 
(4.5531) 
Based upon this preferred equation, the price elasticity of 
area 	 can be derived as done for the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis above 	 [cf. p. 95, supra.]. 	 In the case of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, 	 the short-run elasticity is calculated at 
sample means 	 as being 0.4017, while the long-run elasticity is 
calculated as being 19.1279. 
5.4 Estimated Yield Function  
The yield function expressed as equation (3.54) above was 
used as the starting point for estimation of the yield function of 
the supply model. As theory gave no indication as to the 
functional 	 form of • this equation, 	 linear and double 
logarithmic 	 were experimented with in the empirical examination. 
Table 	 14 shows the results from this experimentation. These 
results indicate that the prototype yield function did not offer a 
good explanation of variation in observed yields. 	 In particular, 
prior 	 expectations_ of the 	 signs of the coefficients 	 were 
incorrect, 	 the estimates were small compared to their standard 
errors, 	 and the goodness-of-fit was rather poor. 	 Autocorrelation 
was also indicated. 
A labour scarcity variable was added at this stage to the 
regressors  to 	 reflect the possible lack of blackcurrant pickers 
during  the sample period. 	 Again, as the predominant area of 
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blackcurrant 	 production 	 is in the Huon Valley, estimates 	 of the 
labour 	 force for 	 this area were used as a scarcity proxy. 	 The 
regressions 	 were performed by OLS, 	 corrected for first-order 
serial correlation. 
A further problem encountered in the estimation of the yield 
function was 	 the presence of multicollinearity between the real 
price 	 and .-real wages 	 variables. 	 By 	 excluding one of these 
variables 	 from 	 the 	 regression, 	 the corresponding T2 was 
effected very 	 little, 	 while 	 the 	 t-statistic of the remaining 
variable was 	 increased 	 significantly. 	 Once again, 	 it 	 is 
necessary to accept the 	 consequences of having an estimated 
equation exhibiting multicollinearity. 
Adding the labour scarcity variable improved the statistical 
precision 	 of the estimates. 	 The over-all fit of the estimates 
improved. 	 The 	 t-statistics 	 indicated 	 that 	 the estimated 
coefficient 	 of 	 the cost variable 	 and the labour scarcity variable 
were 	 significantly 	 different 	 from 	 zero 	 at 	 the usual level of 
significance. 	 However, the 	 estimated coefficients 	 for the real 
price 	 and 	 rainfall variables were not significantly different from 
zero, 	 as given by their 	 t-statistics. 	 Theory has indicated that 
these 	 variables 	 should be included in the yield equation, however. 
Again 	 it 	 is presumed that 	 the lack of 	 significance from zero of 
the 	 real 	 price 	 variable is due 	 to the multicollinearity 	 problem 
mentioned above. 	 It is 	 presumed that the insignificance from zero 
of 	 the 	 rainfall variable is due to the quality of the time series 
for rainfall. 
The 	 preferred estimated equation for yield, given the above 
qualifications is: 
EQN CONSTANT 	 PRICE 
TAbLIL 	 14 
YIELD FUNCTION 
AWE 	 RAIN POPN TIME -2 R DW 
5.24 437.8318 	 .2392 -2.5849 -.3753 -40.2229 .9901 2.5164 
(4.7924) 	 (.9941) (4.5042) (1.3851) (4.5105) 
5.25 472.5774 	 .5533 -.3405 -44.9998 -.6387 .9847 2.4276 
(3.7588) 	 (1.9251) (.9474) (3.6464) (2.9382) 
5.26 385.6596 	 -.0013 -4.9089 -.3203 -34.0140 .6973 .9782 2.3091 
(3.7798) 	 (.0045) (2.9006) (1.2382) (3.3019) (1.4232) 
5.27 408.3003 	 -.0669 -5.3160 -36.2015 .8422 .6900 2.0549 (3.5473) 	 (.2122) (3.2316) (3.1532) (1.7413) 
NOTES: 
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics 
Durbin-Watson statistic is given by DW. 
Sample period is 1967-83 in annual terms 
- 
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(5.24) YIELDt • 437.8318 + .2392 (RPt) - 2.5849 (AWEt) - .3753 (RAINt) 
(4.7924) (.9941) 	 (4.5042) 	 (1.3851) 
- 40.2229 (POPNt). 
(4.5105) 
R2s. .9901 	 DW = 2.5164 
The estimated price elasticity of yield, 	 then, is 	 .2392, 
indicating an inelastic response to price, as expected. 
5.5 Conclusions  
The stated purpose of this chapter was to present estimates 
of the parameters of the supply model utilising the assumptions of 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis and the alternative 
assumptions 	 of the 	 rational expectations 	 hypothesis. 	 The 
preceding sections have met those objectives. 	 It is the purpose 
of 	 this section to discuss the two hypothesies in light of the 
estimates 	 presented and contrast 	 those results with similar 
results 	 published by Jones 	 (1960,1961) 	 for the United Kingdom 
blackcurrent industry. 
Jones (1960,1961) assumed an adaptive expectations approach 
including a stock adjustment mechanism due to the nature of the 
industry. 	 He felt that it was impossible to assume that producers 
could achieve 	 desired levels of plantings within one year due to 
the 	 long 	 lead 	 times 	 involved in blackcurrant plantation 
establishment. Furthermore, the adaptive expectations mechanism 
was included as it was felt that producers did anticipate future 
prices based on past prices even with a degree of price certainty 
afforded by the existence of long- t.e,r,m-c.o:nit,Iralc-t7sn, ;:ifiRgiT: 
processors. 	 Jones used OLS to estimate the parameters of his 
5upply model noting that a unique estimate of the elasticities of 
Idjustment 	 and expectations could not be separately identified 
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[cf. 	 p. 50, supra.]. 	 Jones was, 	 however, able 	 to estimate price 
elasticities from his model. 
The structure 	 of the United Kingdom industry roughly 
corresponds to that of the Tasmanian industry, and so the model 
Jones used was chosen as a comparison reference, especially as a 
similar model was utilised in examining the Tasmanian industry. 
As pointed out above, the adaptive expectations model when 
applied 	 to the Tasmanian industry yields a long-run 	 price 
elasticity 	 significantly greater than that reported by Jones. 
This 	 is surprising in that the Tasmanian market for blackcurrants 
is 	 controlled, where the United Kingdom is characterised as a 
free-market. 	 The estimated price elasticity implies that the 
Tasmanian market is more price responsive that 	 of the United 
Kingdom. 	 However, it is necessary to recognise that the estimated 
long-run 	 price elasticity is a composite of different rates of 
adjustment 	 and price expectations, which were not separately 
identifiable. 	 Hence it 	 is 	 impossible to. assess whether this 
result is due to the elasticity of price expectations or that of 
technical 	 adjustment being greater in Tasmania compared to the 
United Kingdom. Irregardless, the estimated elasticites are 
consistent with a priori  information in that agricultural products 
are usually characterised as being inelastic in the short-run, but 
elastic in the long-run. 
The estimated elasticities derived from the rational 
expectations model again yield a similar conclusion. 	 However, it 
is felt 	 that •the 	 long-run price elasticity was significantly 
less 	 than that actually derived from the empirical results. 	 The 
model embodied a stock adjustment mechanism which allowed the 
separate• estimate 	 of 	 the elasticity of technical adjustment, that 
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is t he coefficie nt of t he lagged depe nde nt variable. 	 I n t his 
case 	 the elasticity of adjust ment was 0.979, which i mplies a 
very rapid 	 adjust ment to long-run 	 or "desired" plantings. 
Again, 	 this result is doubtful based on the biological constraints 
of blackcurrant develop ment. 
The elasticities esti mated for the area function and the 
yield function are the co mponents of the traditional measure of 
t he price elasticit y of s u p pl y. F or t he s h ort-r u n price 
elasticity of supply the short-run price elasticity of area must 
be a d de d to t he price elasticity of yiel d. For t he lo ng r u n, 
however, 	 there 	 is no concept of a long-run price elasticity of 
yield as it is doubtful that producer's decisions in response to 
price levels will have any other than an i m mediate or short run 
i mpact o n yields. For t his reaso n Jo nes disregarded t he yield 
function entirely in his study of the U. K. blackcurrant industry. 
t he lo ng-ru n price elasticity of supply, t he n, is equal to t he 
Long-run price elasticity of area. 
In conclusion, it 	 is apparent 	 that the esti mated rational 
!xpectations model does not closely rese mble that of the adaptive 
!xpectations 	 model for the blackcurrant industry in Tas mania, 
r hic h . w o ul d ha ve rei nf orce d t he n oti o n t hat rati o nal 
xpectat ions were consistent with industry behavior. .Further more, 
he ratio nal ex pectatio ns mo del does not agree wit h prior 
xpectations concerning the magnitude of the esti mated para meters 
lthough 	 t he model does ex hibit ot her desirable statistical 
roperties. 	 Hence the adaptive expectations model shall be 
rlopt.ecraii:als.:-.2-dr uerferre d 	 model for 	 the Tas manian 	 industry, and 	 ...r. 
hall 	 be used in analysis of the applications addressed in the 
ext chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
APPLICATIONS 
6.1 Applications: An introduction  
As noted in the introduction to Chapter One, the purpose of 
the investigation into the blackcurrant industry in Tasmania was 
to examine the factors affecting demand and supply, to measure the 
various strengths of those factors, and to assess the performance 
of the Soft Fruit Industry Board. 
	
Chapter One described the structure of the industry. 	 Chapter 
Two 	 surveyed the 	 literature of 	 regulation and marketing boards. 
Chapter Three 	 outlined various modelling approaches with respect 
to 	 the estimation of comparable commodities. 	 Chapter Four surveyed 
and assessed 	 the available statistical information while Chapter 
Five utilised 	 the 	 information 	 of 	 those 	 two 	 chapters 	 in 	 a 
statistical 	 sense, 	 to 	 form 	 an 	 empirical 	 estimate 	 of 	 the 
coefficients 	 of 	 the proposed 	 model. 	 The 	 estimated coefficients 
were 	 manipulated 	 to yield 	 the measures 	 of the 	 relevant 
elasticities. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to make use of the estimated 
model 	 in an attempt to address 	 the original purposes of the 
research. 	 An assessment of the Soft Fruit industry Board shall be 
considered first. 	 Subsequently, the model will be used to assess 
the 	 effect of recent 	 policy decisions upon the 	 industry. 
Specifically, 	 the 	 effect of 	 the introduction of Closer Economic 
Relations between Australia and New Zealand will be addressed. 
6.2 Assessment of the Soft Fruit Industry Board  
As pointed out above (cf. Section 2.5) it is possible to use 
the estimated econometric model to further assess the performance 
of the Soft Fruit industry Board in meeting its objectives of 
price stability. 	 The 	 "Chow" 	 test has been performed to assess 
the 	 structural 	 change 	 in 	 a similar study by Hallam (1978) on 
the British Egg Marketing Board. In using the Chow test, the sample 
data has 	 been split into two subsamples corresponding to the 
period 	 before 	 and 	 the period after the introduction of 	 the SEIB. 
The preferred 	 equation of 	 the 	 econometric model was then 
reestimated 	 for 	 each of the subsamples, essentially estimating the 
relationships: 
'ft = a0 + al Pt + a2 Zt + 
and: 	 Yt = b0 + b1 Pt + b2 Zt + 
The null hypothesis is that of no structural change, with the 
alternative of structural change, that is: 
Ho: a0=b0, al=b1, a2=b2„. 
Ha: a0=b0, al=b1, a2=b2, . 
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The test statistic is given by: 
(SSEc - SSE1 - SSE2 )/K 
FK,n+m-2K 
where: 
(SSE1 + SSE2 )/(n + m -  2K) 
SSE1 = sum of squared residuals from subsample 1; 
SSE2 = sum of squared residuals from subsample 2; 
SSEc = sum of squared residuals from the pooled subsamples; 
K = number of regressors not including the constant; 
n = number of observations in subsample 1; 
m = number of observations in subsample 2. 
The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative 
for a test statistic greater than the corresponding entry from the 
table 	 for K,n+m-2K 	 degrees-of-freedom for 	 a level 	 of 
significance equal to 1-a. 
Applying the Chow test to the estimated area function 	 lead 
to a calculated 	 test statistic of 3.119. 	 The corresponding entry 
from the F table is 3.18 at the 95 percent level of significance 
with 	 (14,13) 	 degress-of-freedom. 	 Clearly, 	 the 	 calculated 
test statistic does 	 not fail within the 	 critical region. 	 Hence 
the null 	 hypothesis cannot be 	 rejected at 	 the 95 	 percent level 
of significance. 
	
The 	 implication of 	 this 	 test 	 for 	 structural 	 change 
in 	 the Tasmanian blackcurrant 	 industry due 	 to the 	 introduction 
of 	 the Soft 	 Fruit 	 industry 	 Board is rather 	 surprising. 	 One 
would 	 have expected a statutory marketing board with price-setting 
powers and a mandate to stabilise the industry to have effected the 
structure 	 of 	 the 	 industry. 	 This 	 conclusion also 	 seems to 
contradict 	 a 	 conclusion 	 drawn 	 earlier 	 concerning 	 the 
allegation 	 of rubber stamping the free market by the SEIB. 
These two apparently comfl-ict ,ng results can be reconciled 	 by 
the 	 existence 	 of 	 the Fruit 	 Industry Sugar Concession Committee, 
which (as indicated 	 by the 	 industry description 	 in 	 Chapter 
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One) announced recommended prices for blackcurrants for which sugar 
rebates would be payable. The test for rubber stamping appears 
to imply that the pricing policies of the FISCC were significantly 
different from those of a "free market." 
The Chow test implies, then, that no significant structural 
change 	 occurred 	 during 	 the sample 	 period and implicitely 
indicates 	 that the 	 Soft 	 Fruit 	 Industry Board's pricing 
decisions 	 were 	 not significantly different from those of the 
FISCC. 	 It appears 	 that the SFIB was redundant from a pricing 
point-of-view. 	 Essentially the SFIB was rubber stamping the 
pricing decisions of the 	 FISCC. This conclusion is supported by 
the recent 	 I.A.C. 	 report 	 on 	 Fruit and Fruit Products (1981) 
wherein the comment was expressed that: 
. 	 SFIB sets 	 prices 	 for 	 fruit delivered in 
Tasmania and 'these are generally similar to FISCC 
prices. 
	
The promotional 	 powers of the SFIB also seem to be 
redundant. Cascade Cordials' 	 stated objectives were to obtain 
local 	 supplies of blackcurrants, an objective which was backed by 
the 	 issuance of 	 long-term contracts. 	 It 	 is apparent 	 that it 
was 	 in Cascade's 	 interest, 	 then, 	 to promote the 	 industry as it 
would be 	 tied into long-term contracts 	 irregardless. 	 Again, 
the promotion of industry interests seem to have been 
proceeding without the need for a statutory authority to duplicate 
existing efforts. 
6.3 Protection of the Industry  
In this section an examination of the effective protection 
afforded 	 to the Tasmanian industry shall 	 be examined. 	 The 
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discussion 	 shall 	 centre on a domestic content scheme and shall be 
contrasted against protective measures used in New Zealand. A 
final summary of the net effective protection for the industry 
shall be made. 
6.3.1'Domestic Content Schemes  
As 	 pointed out 	 in 	 (1.2) 	 above, 	 the blackcurrant 
industry is afforded the protection of a local content scheme in 
the form of a sales tax exemption for juice products which use at 
least 25% 	 (by volume) of domestic blackcurrant juice. 	 Obviously 
this 	 exemption will have an impact upon the local blackcurrant 
industry 	 in 	 that 	 it virtually 	 guarantees 	 demand 	 for 
domestically 	 produced fruit. 	 The assistance provided by this 
scheme is in the form of a higher price for processing fruit 
which is passed on from the premium paid for domestic juice above 
the equivalent imported juice price. 
	
The industries Assistance Commission considered this 	 type 
of 	 a 	 protective 	 scheme 	 to 	 be 	 undesirable 	 in a 	 report 
concerning assistance 	 to 	 the 	 orange 	 juice 	 industry. 	 In the 
Report (No.302) the Commission stated: 
The 	 assistance provided 	 by 	 the 	 discriminatory. 
exemption 	 is 	 inherently unstable 	 as 	 moderate 
changes 	 to 	 production, consumption, or world prices 
could 	 result 	 in significant changes in the level of 
assistance 	 provided 	 to 	 the industry....This is not 
conducive 	 to efficient resource use in general 'and 
increases 	 the 	 uncertainty facing 	 growers and 
processors 	 in 	 making investment 	 decisions or 
budgeting. 
The sales 	 tax is 	 levied at 	 the wholesale 	 level and 	 is 
usually 	 based 	 on 	 the 	 wholesale 	 price...... 	 tariff . 
equivalent of 	 the 	 sales tax exemption, the wholesale price can be 
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calculated 	 for 	 two 	 scenarios, 	 one where 	 the sales 	 tax 	 is 
avoided 	 by conforming to the local contents requirements, and the 
other where 	 sales 	 tax 	 is 	 paid, 	 as 	 a 	 result 	 of 	 not 
conforming to local requirements. In the .case where sales tax is 
avoided by using the required local contents the wholesale price is 
given by: 
 
Pw = (1—x)Pf + xPd + m (6.1) 
where: Pw = wholesale domestic price 
Pf = CIF imported price 
Pd = domestic price 
x = required percentage of local product 
m = wholesale markup and packing costs 
ST = sales tax as a percentage of 1. 
 
For blackcurrant juice the required local .content for sales tax 
exemption is 25% by volume. 	 Furthermore, the blackcurrant juice 
product must have at 	 least 25a. by volume of blackcurrant juice 
under national food standards. 	 Therefore, to qualify for the sales 
tax exemption the blackcurrant juice component (259 by volume) must 
be entirely composed of local blackcurrant juice. Hence, equation 
(6.1) becomes: 
Pw 	 + m = pd (6.1A) 
	
• in the second instance 	 sales tax is paid, therefore: 
Pw = (1+ST)((1—x)Pf + xP + m). 	 (6.2) 
If the domestic price in this context is greater than the 
foreign price, the minimum wholesale price ;(and therefore minimum 
sales tax payable) will be given -by using all foreign 
product. 	 Therefore the equation (6.2) becomes: 
Pw = (1+ST) (Pf + m) 
(6.3) 
  
The maximum amount of protection is afforded when the wholesale 
price in these two situations are equated, that is: 
Pd + m = 	 (1 + ST) (Pf + m) 	 (6.4) 
111 
which leads to the domestic price: 
P 	 = P 	 (1 + ST) + ST.m -d (6.5) 
which is 	 the maximum the processors will pay 	 for the domestic 
input. 	 The tariff equivalent of the protection afforded to the 
local industry then is: 
(Pd — Pf) / Pf = ST (1 + m/Pf) 	 (6.6) 
It can be seen that the level of protection given by the 
existence 	 of this local 	 content scheme 	 will increase with 
increases in 	 the sales tax and the wholesalers' 	 margin, and 
will decrease with increases in the foreign price. 
Applying 	 this 	 calculation 	 to 	 the Tasmanian 
industry, 	 the protection afforded by the scheme 	 can be 
quantified. 	 Due 	 to 	 the nature of the variable, 	 it was not 
possible 	 to obtain a direct estimate 	 of 	 the wholesalers' 
markup. 	 However, 	 a private communication with a purchaser of 
blackcurrant 	 juice enabled an 	 indirect estimate to be used. 
Appendix 	 III 	 details 	 the 	 derivation of 	 this 	 estimate. 
Furthetmore, 	 the 	 CIF import price has been estimated as the 
current 	 CIF price of New Zealand blackcurrant juice. 	 The tariff 
equivalent, then, is given by: 
t = Pd - Pf 	 = 	 .2( 1 + (1.09/1.31) ) 	 (6.7) 
Pf 
.366 . 
6.3.2 New Zealand Taxation. Incentive Scheme  
As mentioned in (1.2) above. the New Zealand blackcurrant 
industry enjoys 	 the protection afforded by the Export Performance 
Taxation 	 incentive scheme which allows New Zealand exporters to 
claim a 	 tax credit 	 for exports 	 of berry fruit 	 products. 	 These 
products 	 are 	 o?.tay:orised 	 in 	 a 	 schedule of export 	 goods which 
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qualify 	 for 	 the 	 scheme. 	 Table 	 15 	 specifies 	 the export 
incentive for each catagory.- The tax 	 credit for blackcurrant 
juice 	 (band C 	 is 9.1 percent of the FOB sales value. 	 H. Lipton 
(1982) 	 showed the effective pricing advantage this tax credit 
yielded 	 for potatoes. 	 The calculation can be used 	 for 
blackcurrants after substituting 	 the band C rate of 9.1 percent 
for the 	 band B rate of 	 10.5 percent. 	 To calculate this price 
advantage let: 
post-tax income with the expont incentive 
= y - cost - (tax - 0.091(y)) 	 (6.8) 
equivalent post tax income without the incentive 
= El - cost - E(tax) 	 (6.9) 
where: 	 y = nominal export return 
cost = production cost 
tax = before tax income multiplied by the tax rate, 
i.e. (y - cost)t 
t = New Zealand tax rate (.43) 
El = effective export return 
E(tax) = post tax income multiplied by the tax rate, 
i.e. (El - cost)t. 
To solve for El set equations (6.8) and (6.9) equal to each other: 
El - cost - (El - cost)t 	 = y - cost - ((y - cost)t - 0.091(y)1 
then: 	 EY(1 - t) 	 = 	 y(1.091 - t) 
El 	 = 	 y(1.091 -'-t) (6v10) 
 
( 1 -t ) 
 
Table 15 
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation Incentive  
	
Nominal 	 Effective 
Product 	 Band 	 Rate 	 Rate 
Fresh Berry Fruit 	 F 	 4.2 	 7.6 
Frozen Berry Fruit 	 D 	 -.7;.-'.7,  
Blackcurrant Juice 	 C 	 9.1 	 16.6 
Source: 'Department 	 of 	 Trade 	 and 	 Industry, 	 New -Zealand (private 
communication) 
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Thus at the normal New Zealand company tax rate of 45 percent, the 
incentive creates an effective increase in the price received by 
the New Zealand exporters of 16.6 percent. 
6.3.3 Net Effect on-Protection of the Blackcurrant Juice Industry  
As noted above in (1.2) the Sales tax exemption was 
modified in the 1983 Federal Budget to allow the sourcing of fruit 
juices from New Zealand. The impact of the modification, then, can 
be seen as reducing the protection of the Tasmanian 
blackcurrant 	 juice processors 	 (or 	 producers 	 if 	 it is 
assumed that wholesalers' margins remain stable) by 36.6 percent. 
However, as previously noted, the New Zealand industry is 
afforded the luxury of a 16.6 percent tariff equivalent taxation 
Incentive which will be removed progressively by 1987. 
Therefore, the net decrease in protection of the blackcurrant 
juice industry upon the phasing out 'of the New Zealand taxation 
incentive will be 18.4 percent. 
The upshot of a decrease in protection to an industry is 
that 	 the 	 local 	 price received should fall 	 by that amount. 	 In 
the 	 present case the actual 	 price received by farmers will 
continue to be 	 set by 	 the 	 Soft 	 Fruit industry Board. 
However, 	 it will be less expensive for a processor to use New 
Zealand blackcurrant juice after CER relatively. 	 Hence, to remain 
competitive. 	 the Tasmanian blackcurrant price must fall by the 18.4 
percent. 
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The 	 price 	 elasticity of supply estimated above 
indicated 	 a 	 relatively inelastic 	 response 	 to 	 price 	 for 
blackcurrants in the short-run. 	 Due to the nature of the phasing 
out of 	 New Zealand's incentive schemes, 	 the short-run effect 
on 	 the 	 supply of blackcurrants should be evaluated by the rate 
for which no adjustment 	 has been made for the New Zealand 
incentives. 	 As 	 pointed out 	 in Section (6.3.1) 	 the decrease 
in 	 protection 	 was calculated to be 36.6 percent for the change 
to the sales 	 tax exemption on fruit juices. 	 Using the estimated 
short-run 	 elasticity of supply of 	 .9939, 	 the decrease 	 in 
protection due 	 to 	 this policy change would be 	 in the order of 
36 	 percent, 	 which if applied to the mean value of production 
would be approximately 343 tonnes per annum. 
The long run effects of the change to protection 
to 	 the blackcurrant 	 industry is slightly higher, being in the 
order of 38 percent. 	 This effect is 	 due to 	 the phasing out of 
New Zealand 	 incentives 	 giving 	 a net decrease in 	 protection of 
18.4 percent 	 evaluated 	 at a 	 long-run elasticity of supply of 
2.0671. 	 Hence, the decrease in production in the long run would 
be approximately 359 tonnes per annum. 
6.4 Welfare Effects  
Using 	 the 	 concepts 	 of 	 surplus 	 it 	 is 	 possible 	 to 
assess 	 the 	 efficiency of 	 a 	 policy decision. 	 The basic model of 
consumer 	 and producer surplus hs been presented in Section (2.5) 
above. 	 As 	 the results of the empirical 	 examination only allowed 
the . 	 estTtatlonfthe price elasticity of supply, it is only 
possible 	 assess 	 the implications of Closer Economic Relations in 'a 
welfare 	 sense 	 from 	 the 	 supply side . As pointed out in Section 
(6.3.3) 	 above, 	 the 	 net 	 change 	 in protection on the blackcurrant 
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juice 	 industry amounts 	 to an estimated 	 18.4 	 percent upon the 
phasing out of the New 	 Zealand Export Performance Taxation 
Incentive. 	 Thus, 	 one would expect the price of Tasmanian 
blackcurrents 	 to fall by this same percentage if the industry is 
to remain competitive with New Zealand growers. 
We have shown that on efficiency grounds this cut back in 
price will lead to a decrease in quantity supplied, thereby 
giving an decrease in the producers' surplus. 
The elasticity of supply can be used to assess the 
change 	 in producer's 	 surplus. 	 When 	 evaluated 	 from 	 the 
pre-change equilibrium, 	 Nerlove 	 (1957) 	 has shown that 	 the 
elasticity of supply can be approximated as: 
'  AQ* Po 	 (6.11) 
Q0 	 AP 
We define the percentage change 	 in price as x=Ap/p0. 	 The 
change 	 in surplus is given by the area p*CDp2 less the area BCD in 
Figure 	 3. 	 The 	 percentage decrease 	 in 	 producers 	 surplus (PS) 
when evaluated at equilibrium values is given by: 
APS = AP(Qo - AQ) - .5AQAP 
 
(6.12) 
the percentage change 	 in 
P Q 	 P Q 0 0 	 0 0 
After algebraic manipulation 
producers' surplus is given by: 
3 
PS = x(1- - 	 x) 
2 
 
(6.13) 
This concept of surplus as a measurement of the  
effects 	 of 	 a 	 policy 	 change is 	 from the 	 traditional Marshallian 
measure of welfare. 
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For. the blackcurrant juice industry then, the welfare effect 
of 	 a decrease in protection of 18.4 	 percent can be readily seen 
to be 7.9 percent, 	 when evaluated using the estimated long-run 
price elasticity of supply of 2.0671 as presented in Chapter Five. 
As mentioned in Section 	 (2.2) 	 above one of 	 the 
justifications 	 for government intervention into a market was if 
the 	 distribution of income towards a group was considered to be 
in 	 It 	 was pointed out that this is, in general, the 
at 	 of 	 governments towards agricultural producers. 	 It was 
also mentioned 	 that 	 in the case of 	 soft 	 fruits, 	 due 	 to 	 the 
predominant 	 location of the majority of the production being 
in 	 the 	 Huon 	 Valley, 	 the distributional 	 concerns 	 were 
apparent. It is therefore appropriate to consider that one of 
the principle aims of the Soft Fruit industry Board must have 
been to help redistribute income towards these producers with the 
potential to counter the stifling effects of monopsonistic demand. 
The approximate maintenance of 	 real prices throughout the 
period of 	 its 	 existence has 	 shown 	 the SFIB to be effective in 
continuing 	 the 	 pricing 	 policies 	 started 	 by 	 the FISCC . 	 It is 
also apparent 	 that 	 this 	 result 	 would not have occurred if the 
farm-gate 	 price 	 had 	 been left to the free market to determine, in 
that 	 it has 	 been .shown 	 that the SFIB is not rubber stamping the 
free market. 
It is 	 therefore apparent 	 that the SFIB has been 
successful 	 in 	 redistributing income 	 towards 	 the 	 blackcurrant 
growers 	 from, 	 0 ,t-Ima.te1y, ItAp consumers of blackcurrant juice. 
However, 	 with 	 this 	 success 	 in 	 mind, 	 the 	 introduction 	 of 	 the 
change in the treatment of New Zealand blackcurrant juice as a part 
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of 	 C.E.R. 	 is 	 in obvious 	 contrast. 	 As 	 shown above, 	 the 
introduction of this policy change leads to a negative welfare 
effect seen as a Pareto and a redistribution of income away 
from growers. The policy change is obvioustiy inconsistent with 
the implied nature of the SFIB. 
6.5 Conclusions  
To sum up, we have shown that the Soft Fruit Industry 
Board 	 has been continuing the policies (in tandem) of an existing 
marketing board, 	 albeit effectively. 	 Secondly, we have seen that 
the 	 major processor 	 has such a major committment to the 
processing of blackcurrants so 	 as to remove the justification 
of 	 a marketing board for promotional reasons. 	 Thirdly, 	 we 
have shown that a Federal government policy change will have major 
repercussions 	 on the blackcurrant industry despite the lobbying 
by the 	 Soft Fruit industry Board. 
In conclusion, 	 then, 	 it 	 appears 	 that 	 the 	 only 
justification 	 for 	 the 	 existence 	 of the 	 Soft Fruit 	 Industry 
Board 	 is 	 to 	 act as a 	 "watch dog" 	 over the 	 market, in 	 an 
attempt 	 to give producers a more 	 effective 	 bargaining 
position 	 in 	 negotiations 	 with processors. 	 Producer 
sentiment, 	 although being unquantifiable, suggests that this role 
for 	 the 	 Soft. Fruit 	 industry 	 Board 	 is not being effectively 
performed. 
APPENDIX I 
Closer Economic Relations (C.E.R.) 
Package for Blackcurrants 
1. Fresh Blackcurrants  
Situation under NAFTA  
No Australian tariff or quantitative restrictions; 
No New Zealand tariff; 
New Zealand quantitative restrictions-; 
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive 
Scheme rate of 4.2 percent (nominal). 
C.E.R. Package  
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive 
Scheme rate to be phased out over the period April 
1, 1983 to Aprit 1, 1986 as follows: 
April 1, 1983 -- 75 percent of rate applies: 
April 1, 1984 -- 50 percent of rate applies; 
April 1, 1985 -- 25 percent of rate applies; 
April 1, 1986 -- nil. 
New Zealand 	 import 	 licenses 	 liberalised 	 over 
1983-1995 period. ' 
2. Frozen Blackcurrants:  
Situation under NAFTA  
No Australian tariff or quantitative restrictions.;.„ 
New Zealand tariff; 
New Zealand quantitative restrictions; 
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive. 
Scheme rates of 7.7 percent (nominal). 
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C.E.R. Package  
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive 
Scheme rate to be phased out using the same 
schedule as for fresh blackcurrants. 
The New Zealand tariff will be phased out as 
follows: 
1983 	 5 percent tariff to apply; 
1984 	 Duty free. 
3. Blackcurrant Juice  
Situation under NAFTA  
No Australian tariff or quantitative restrictions; 
20% New Zealand tariff; 
New Zealand quantitative restrictions; 
Australian Sales Tax exemption 	 of 20 percent 
(nominal) on products using at least 25 percent (by 
volume) of local fruit juice; 
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive 
Scheme rates of 9.1 percent (nominal). 
C.E.R. Package  
Australian Sales Tax Exemption changed in 1983 
Federal Budget to include New Zealand fruit juice 
as "local" fruit juice; 
New Zealand Export Performance Taxation incentive 
Scheme rate to be phased out using the same 
schedule as for fresh blackcurrants. 
The New Zealand tariff will 	 be phased out as 
follows: 
1983 	 15 percent tariff to apply; 
1984 	 10 percent tariff to apply; 
1985 	 5 percent tariff to apply; 
1986 Duty free. 
Mr- I- 1:4 ,11-I1 A 11 
DATA 
YEAR PRODN 
(TNE) 
YIELD 
(TNE/HA) 
BEARING 
AREA 
(TNE/HA) 
NON BEARING 
AREA 
(HA) 
PRICE 
($/KG) 
JUICE 
PRICE 
,($/LTR) 
57-58 1169 0 0 0 0.275 0 
58-59 1319 0 0 0 0.270 0 
59-60 1345 0 0 0 0.270 0 
60-61 1405 0 0 0 0.257 0 
61-62 996 0 0 0 0.257 0 
62-63 1399 3.562 383 52 0.250 0 
63-64 1342 3.386 396 39 0.260 0 
64-65 1044 2.947 354 32 0.230 0 
65-66 1333 4.302 310 21 0.210 0 
66-67 1233 4.381 281 19 0.250 0 
67-68 981 4.417 222 36 0.290 0.44 
68-69 1197 5.015 239 26 0.290 0.42 
69-70 936 4.007 1 234 35 0.310 0.45 
70-71 1015 4.268 238 42 0.330 0.49 
71-72 1140 4.793 238 64 0.330 0.53 
72-73 806 3.910 232 89 0.350 0.56 
73-74 865 4.003 216 98 0.390 0.54 
74-75 951 4.167 228 96 0.470 0.62 
75-76 470 2.257 208 74 0.500 0.72 
76-77 575 2.772 207 68 0.550 0.80 
77-78 681 3.253 209 69 0.700 0.94 
78-79 787 3.874 203 74 0.720 1.02 
79-80 1102 4.507 245 105 0.780 1:16 
80-81 772 3.059 252 112 0.800 1.36 
81 - 82 1005 4.220 238 82 0.665 1.48 
82-83 761 3.092 246 58 0.549 1.56 
83-84 832 3.749 222 36 0.654 1.71 
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APPENDIX III 
WHOLESALERS' MARK-UP 
The sholesaler's mark-up used in the calculation of the 
tariff equivalent of the local content scheme for blackcurrant 
juice was derived from data obtained in a personal communication 
with a major blackcurrant juice user. In the communication the 
average price paid for Tasmanian blackcurrant juice concentrate was 
given. This price, when apportioned down into a single strength 
equivalent, was used as the basis for the mark-up calculation. 
Charley, 	 et.al. 	 (1980) 	 have estimated 	 that 	 the yield of 
blackcurrant juice per kilogram of blackcurrant fruit is 
approximately 1.0, depending largely upon the process used. Taking 
this yield estimate, it is possible to calculate the input price 
per litre. 
The wholesaler's mark-up can be expressed as: 
M=P  - P 0 
Thus: 
where 
P 	 = P (y) 
H = P 	 - P (y) 0 
M = wholesalers' mark-up 
Po= wholesalers' price single strength juice per litre 
Pi= wholesalers' input price per litre 
Pio= blackcurrant price per kilogram excluding bounty paid 
y = yield (litres of juice per kilogram of fruit) 
Hence the wholesalers'margin is estimated as being:r, 
M = 1.69 - 0.60 	 = 1.09 per litre 
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